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Abstract 
We investigate the changes in women’s employment patterns across EU countries over the last 20 
years both in terms of labour market participation and type of jobs using individual data from ECHP 
and  EUSILC  databases.  Using  a  logistic  multilevel  model,  we  then  pin  down  the  role  played  by 
institutional and policy changes in explaining women’s employment. The key results indicate that 
women’s  employment  trends  are  related  to  the  institutional  and  policy  changes  that  have  been 
introduced  in  almost  all  European  countries  since  the  end  of  the  1990s.  Such  changes  had  an 
important impact on the labour market ‘opportunities’ of women by affecting the quality of potential 
jobs available, the chances to (re-)enter the labour market and the opportunity costs of employment 
(vs. non-employment). 
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1.  Introduction 
Over  the  last  two  decades,  many  European  countries  experienced  an  increase  in  female 
labour force participation and employment. On average, the participation rate has increased 
from around 55% in the early 1990s to more than 66% in 2008 (Figure 1). In the same period 
the women’s employment rate has moved to the same direction, by increasing from 49% to 
61% (Figure 2). This steady improvement in women’s labour market position has led to a 
significant  decline  in  the  gender  employment  gap,  defined  as  the  difference  in  the 
employment rate between men and women, which have nearly halved since 1990, from more 
than  25%  to  almost  14%  in  2008.  The  observed  aggregate  increase  in  participation  and 
employment hides substantial differences both across different groups of women and across 
countries suggesting an important role for cross-country heterogeneity in the factors that 
affect women’s labour market outcomes. 
The existing literature has identified a number of factors that could have contributed to the 
overall changes in women’s labour market behaviour: changes in cultural attitudes towards 
work (especially in countries where participation is traditionally lower), demographic factors 
(with a larger share of population in prime working age), changes in the characteristics of the 
female population (e.g. fertility decisions both in terms of the number of children and age at 
which having the first child) and educational choices. Other pertinent factors include reforms 
of  the  welfare  state  and  changes  of  labour  market  institutions  and  policies  specifically 
targeted  at  groups  with  lower  attachment  to  the  labour  market.  Changes  in  the  labour 
market behaviour of women with specific characteristics (e.g. a desire for smaller families) 
may  reflect  changing  preferences  (cultural  attitudes  towards  work)  but  also  changes  in 
restrictions that prevented women from participating in the past. 
Recent empirical literature (Petrongolo, 2004) has questioned the role played by the growth 
of ‘atypical’ jobs during the last decade, typically part-time and temporary occupations, in 
explaining recent labour market developments. Part-time work represents an opportunity for 
flexible hours of work and for combining wage work with family commitments, especially 
for women. However, in some cases, part-time work might as well be considered as a form 
of  underemployment,  when  lower  wages  are  combined  with  low  job  security  and  weak 
occupational attachment (OECD, 1999). Similarly, temporary contracts may provide firms 
with a useful means of screening workers, and therefore represent stepping-stones towards 
permanent employment. However, they have been frequently used as a cheaper option to 
adjust  firm-level  employment,  especially  in  countries  where  regular  worker  are  over-
protected.  The  incidence  of  part-time  jobs  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  of  temporary  jobs  is 
traditionally  higher  among  women  than  men  (see  Figures  3  and  4).  On  average,  more 
women work part-time in central and northern Europe than in the south, while no major 
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geographical pattern can be detected for men. The incidence of temporary contracts seems 
slightly higher among women than men, although it varies more across countries than across 
genders.  Although  men  and  women  both  experienced  an  increase  in  part-time  and 
temporary employment over the last 20 years, the progressive deregulation of the labour 
market could not necessarily be gender neutral. As a matter of fact, occupational flexibility 
typically affects men at the beginning and at the end of their working life, whereas women 
are  more  frequently  involved  in  temporary  and  part-time  occupations  throughout  their 
working life.1 
As a consequence, on the one hand, the increasing availability of ‘atypical’ jobs and more 
flexible  forms  of  employment may  have  helped  women  to  better  integrate  in  the  labour 
market  and  narrow  the  employment  gap  with  men.  On  the  other  hand,  this  integration 
process may have occurred at the expense of increasing gender job segregation, to the extent 
that  differences  across  genders  in  the  ‘quality’  of  occupation  are  not  fully  explained  by 
different preferences or productivity of men and women. 
The objective of the paper is two-fold. The first is to assess the recent trends in women’s 
employment and labour market participation with a focus on the changes in the ‘type’ of 
occupation (temporary vs. regular and part-time vs. full-time) women are involved in. We 
begin  our  analysis  by  developing  a  time-variant  country-specific  synthetic  indicator  for 
quantifying the female labour market performance (relative to men) by considering both the 
quantitative (employment and participation) and qualitative (type of contract) dimensions of 
labour  market  attachment.  This  is  done  by  estimating  simple  binary  choice  regression 
models for the period 1994-2009 for the probabilities of participating in the labour force, 
being  employed,  working  part-time  and  holding  a  fixed-term  contract,  controlling  for  a 
number of individual and job characteristics. In the second part of the paper, we focus on the 
role  played  by  the  interplay  of  macro-institutional  factors  and  policies  and  individual 
characteristics in explaining the observed trends and cross-country differences by means of a 
multi-level approach. In particular, we question the role that the reforms towards a model of 
a ‘flexicure’ labour market have played in explaining recent trends in women’s participation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the related 
literature are section 3 describes the data used throughout the analysis. We summarize the 
large  quantity  of  micro-level  information  available  for  different  European  countries  and 
across time using synthetic indicators of female labour market performance in section 4. The 
results of the multivariate regression analysis of women's involvement in the labour market 
across time and countries are reported in section 5. Finally, the relevance of the institutional 
framework  of  the  labour  market  and  family  policies  in  explaining  the  trends  and  cross-
country differences in woman’s labour market involvement is explored using a multilevel 
approach in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Literature review 
With  foundations  in  microeconomics,  the  traditional  economic  literature  on  women's 
employment has largely focused on the costs and benefits of paid labour relative to domestic 
                                                   
1 There is a large literature showing that part-time work may have negative effects on wages and 
career  prospects  (especially  in  countries  where  it  is  widespread).  Part-time  jobs  tend  to  be  more 
frequent in low-qualified occupations with a negative impact on women's career opportunities. In the 
UK and US, mothers are more likely to work in part-time jobs and earn lower wages compared with 
women without children. Mothers working part-time also have significantly lower hourly wages in 
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work  and  other  pursuits.  According  to neoclassical  models  of  labour  supply,  a  woman's 
attachment to the labour market is strictly related to the balance between her reservation 
wage and her market wage. The reservation wage is the lowest wage rate at which a worker 
would be willing to accept a particular type of job. It depends on several factors and may 
also  change  over  time.  In  this  view,  housework  and  family-care  duties  typically  reduce 
women's involvement in labour force by increasing their reservation wage. Indeed, families 
with women in paid labour need to outsource household labour; hence, when the hourly 
market  price  for  household  labour  is  larger  than  the  hourly  woman's  market  wage,  the 
woman typically opts out of the labour force. A large number of research papers has proved 
the  negative  association  between  household-related  responsibilities  and  women's 
employment (see, among many others, Goodpaster, 2010; Leigh, 2010; and Munasinghe et al., 
2008). Education has been found as another major determinant of women's employment: by 
increasing women's potential market wages, it affects fertility and labour supply decisions 
(Gustaffsson & Kenjoh, 2008; Euwals et al., 2011). 
Recent research contends that the overall increase in women's labour force participation and 
attachment to work may be attributed to structural changes in the economy that influence 
the demand for, and supply of, women workers. In particular, cultural norms on gender 
roles and welfare state developments are found to be responsible for the general increase in 
women's labour force participation in OECD countries from 1960 to 1990. 
Several studies find that women's employment responds positively to policies alleviating the 
financial  burden  of  child-rearing,  both  in  the  form  of  family-related  subsidies  (see,  for 
example, Bardasi & Gornick, 2003; Jaumotte, 2003; Sánchez-Mangas & Sánchez-Marcos, 2008) 
and fiscal reductions (Eissa & Liebman, 1996; Alesina et al., 2007). In particular, countries 
with more generous parental leave schemes or public childcare facilities are characterized by 
a larger involvement of women in paid labour (see, for example, Berlinski & Galiani, 2007; 
Powell,  1998;  Anderson  &  Levine,  1999;  Attanasio,  et  al.  2008).  Interestingly,  some 
researchers compare the effectiveness of monetary support versus the public provision of 
child-care services. For example, Apps & Rees (2004) find that, among OECD countries, those 
supporting motherhood through childcare facilities rather than child benefits tend to exhibit 
both higher rates of women's labour supply and higher fertility rates. Similarly, Lundin et al. 
(2008) point out that women's labour supply may be more elastic to the quantity of publicly 
provided childcare facilities than to their price. 
The  available  evidence  on  the  effect  of  parental  care  on  the  propensity  to  be  employed 
provides mixed results and mostly in the US context. Early studies by Wolf & Soldo (1994) 
and Stern (1995) provide no evidence of a negative relationship between elderly care and 
women's employment. Conversely, more recent findings show that caring for parents living 
outside the household and intergenerational co-residence exerts a large negative impact on 
the labour supply of both men and women (see Ettner, 1996; Heitmueller, 2007; Johnson & 
Lo Sasso, 2000). 
Finally, a number of studies have documented the impact of labour market institutions on 
women's employment and labour market participation in European countries (see, among 
others,  Jaumotte,  2003  and  Genre  et  al.,  2005  and  2010).  They  find  that  labour  market 
institutions matter for women's attachment to employment and labour force. In particular, 
according to Genre et al. (2005 and 2010), higher union density, more employment protection 
and more generous unemployment benefits lower participation rates. Conversely, Balleer et 
al. (2009) find that a number of institutional factors, such as labour taxes, union density, 
unemployment  benefits  and  the  average  number  of  children,  has  an  impact  on  women's 
labour force participation rates, although the specific impact varies across age groups and 
countries. 4 | CIPOLLONE, PATACCHINI & VALLANTI 
 
3.  Data and descriptive statistics 
We  combine  annual  micro-data  from  two  different  sources,  the  ECHP  (European 
Community Household Panel) and the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions), to create a unique dataset of comparable household and individual level 
characteristics across countries and over time. 
The ECHP micro-data is a household survey with a common framework conducted across 
EU-15 member states under the supervision of Eurostat. ECHP data were first collected in 
1994,  when  a  sample  of  60,500  nationally  representative  households  (i.e.  approximately 
130,000 adults aged over 16) were interviewed in 12 member states. Austria has joined the 
project in the second wave in 1995, Finland in 1996 and Sweden in 1997. Therefore, since 
then, the data cover all (old) EU-15 member states. The total duration of the ECHP is eight 
years,  running  from  1994  to  2001.  The  dataset  includes  information  on  family  size  and 
composition, living conditions and several income measures. Therefore it provides a source 
of mutually comparable income data of EU member countries at the turn of the 20th and 21th 
centuries. 
EU-SILC is the successor of the ECHP. The EU-SILC provides harmonised cross-sectional 
and longitudinal multi-dimensional micro-data on income and social exclusion in European 
countries. After its start in 2003 with seven European countries, in the 2004 wave it covered 
all old EU-15 member states except Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Since 2005, the 
dataset involves the 25 EU member states, plus Norway and Iceland, and it is the largest 
comparative  survey  of  European  income  and  living  conditions.  The  2009  wave  has  been 
recently released. 
In  order  to  obtain  a  unique  dataset  of  comparable  household  and  individual  level 
characteristics across EU countries within the period 1994-2009, we limited the analysis to the 
EU-15  member  states2  and  selected  individual  and  household  characteristics.  Summary 
statistics of the women and men samples are presented in Tables 1 and 2. All illustrative 
materials (Tables and Figures) can be found in the Annex. 
The overall sample includes 1,657,367 individuals between 25 and 64 years of age of which 
851,010 are women and 806,357 are men. The employment and participation rates stand at 
59% and 66%, respectively, for the female sample, and increase to approximately 80% and 
86%, respectively, for the male sample. The percentage of highly educated women and men 
is  27%  and  women  are  slightly  more  represented  than  men  among  the  lowest  educated 
individuals. Over 65% of respondents in both samples describe themselves as live in-couple. 
42% of women and 23% of men live in households with at least one child under 14 years of 
age, and 18% of them live in households with at least one pre-school age child. Co-living 
with  elderly  (that  is,  individuals  with  70  years  old  or  more)  involves  just  6%  of  all 
individuals in our sample. Among those living as a couple, approximately 27% reported that 
their partner has achieved a lower or an upper secondary education (ISCED 0-2 and ISCED 
3-5); 20% reported highly-educated partners (ISCED 5-7). The variable ‘cycle’ measures the 
business cycle frequencies of national GDP over the survey years, 1994-2009. This variable 
has been obtained by implementing the filter proposed by Hodrick & Prescott (1997).3 
                                                   
2 Namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
3 Italy and Spain are over-represented in the sample (16% of the surveyed respondents live in Italy 
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Table 1. Summary statistics: Female sample
 
   Variable  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
Individual 
characteristics 
employed  851010  0.594  0.491  0  1 
active  851010  0.656  0.475  0  1 
male  851010  0.000  0.000  0  0 
age  851010  44.269  11.078  25  64 
ISCED02  832447  0.382  0.486  0  1 
ISCED35  832447  0.344  0.475  0  1 
ISCED57  832447  0.274  0.446  0  1 
single  844864  0.189  0.392  0  1 
incouple  844864  0.687  0.464  0  1 
separated  844864  0.018  0.132  0  1 
divorced  844864  0.067  0.250  0  1 
widowed  844864  0.039  0.193  0  1 
Household 
characteritsics 
children  851010  0.713  1.008  0  15 
child  851010  0.422  0.494  0  1 
child06  851010  0.179  0.383  0  1 
child03  851010  0.096  0.295  0  1 
child36  851010  0.113  0.317  0  1 
child614  851010  0.259  0.438  0  1 
old70  851010  0.060  0.238  0  1 
pISCED02  851010  0.276  0.447  0  1 
pISCED35  851010  0.258  0.438  0  1 
pISCED57  851010  0.198  0.398  0  1 
Trend 
year  851010  2003  4.983  1994  2009 
cycle  842730  0.006  1.958  -8.636  4.172 
Country of residence 
DK  851010  0.044  0.206  0  1 
NL  851010  0.070  0.255  0  1 
BE  851010  0.045  0.207  0  1 
FR  851010  0.074  0.262  0  1 
IE  851010  0.043  0.203  0  1 
IT  851010  0.156  0.362  0  1 
GR  851010  0.060  0.237  0  1 
ES  851010  0.111  0.314  0  1 
PT  851010  0.054  0.227  0  1 
AT  851010  0.043  0.204  0  1 
FI  851010  0.068  0.252  0  1 
SE  851010  0.048  0.213  0  1 
DE  851010  0.087  0.282  0  1 
LU  851010  0.035  0.183  0  1 
UK  851010  0.062  0.241  0  1 
 
   
                                                   
  ISCED02  (pISCED02):  lower  secondary  education  of  the  woman  (of  her  partner);  ISCED35 
(pISCED35): upper secondary education of the woman (of her partner); ISCED57 (pISCED57): tertiary 
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Table 2. Summary statistics: Male sample
 
   Variable  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
Individual 
characteristics 
employed  806357  0.797  0.402  0  1 
active  806357  0.857  0.350  0  1 
male  806357  1.000  0.000  1  1 
age  806357  44.229  11.137  25  64 
ISCED02  788367  0.360  0.480  0  1 
ISCED35  788367  0.368  0.482  0  1 
ISCED57  788367  0.273  0.445  0  1 
single  799834  0.257  0.437  0  1 
incouple  799834  0.675  0.468  0  1 
separated  799834  0.013  0.112  0  1 
divorced  799834  0.046  0.209  0  1 
widowed  799834  0.010  0.098  0  1 
Household 
characteritsics 
children  806357  0.435  0.925  0  14 
child  806357  0.225  0.418  0  1 
child06  806357  0.180  0.384  0  1 
child03  806357  0.100  0.300  0  1 
child36  806357  0.112  0.315  0  1 
child614  806357  0.244  0.430  0  1 
old70  806357  0.061  0.239  0  1 
pISCED02  806357  0.278  0.448  0  1 
pISCED35  806357  0.261  0.439  0  1 
pISCED57  806357  0.198  0.398  0  1 
Trend 
year  806357  2003.000  4.985  1994  2009 
cycle  798435  0.012  1.959  -8.636  4.172 
Country of residence 
DK  806357  0.045  0.207  0  1 
NL  806357  0.068  0.253  0  1 
BE  806357  0.044  0.205  0  1 
FR  806357  0.073  0.261  0  1 
IE  806357  0.043  0.202  0  1 
IT  806357  0.159  0.366  0  1 
GR  806357  0.060  0.238  0  1 
ES  806357  0.111  0.314  0  1 
PT  806357  0.053  0.224  0  1 
AT  806357  0.043  0.203  0  1 
FI  806357  0.073  0.260  0  1 
SE  806357  0.049  0.216  0  1 
DE  806357  0.083  0.276  0  1 
LU  806357  0.036  0.187  0  1 
UK  806357  0.059  0.235  0  1 
 
   
                                                   
 ISCED02 (pISCED02): lower secondary education of the man (of his partner); ISCED35 (pISCED35): 
upper secondary education of the man (of his partner); ISCED57 (pISCED57): tertiary education of the 
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4.  A micro-data-based unified framework for cross-country comparisons 
The purpose of this section is to present some evidence about trends of women’s labour 
market performance in Europe, which would be valuable for cross-country comparisons. The 
analysis introduces a synthetic index of labour  market performance, which measures the 
extent  to  which  women  and  men  can  be  distinguished  from  each  other  on  the  basis  of 
commonly  observed  social  and  economic  characteristics  in  different  countries  and  across 
time.  The  results  are  thus  able  to  convey  information  relevant  to  the  ongoing  political 
debates about changes in female work status by measuring the degree of distinction between 
women  and  men  along  different  labour  market  indicators  and  controlling  for  a  set  of 
standard individual characteristics.4 
The index can be computed for different education and age groups and by splitting countries 
according to the institutional regime they belong to. It can then serve to provide reliable 
answers to questions such as: Are the differences between women and men today larger than 
they  were  in  the  recent  or  distant  past?  In  which  countries  are  these  tendencies  more 
pronounced?  And  how  rapidly  do  these  differences  shrink?  Are  there  differences  by 
education  or  age  groups?  We  compute  the  index  using  data  capturing  conditions  in  15 
European countries as recent as 2009, and as early as 1994 and performing statistical tests 
assessing the statistical significance of the observed differences across time. 
Borrowing from Vigdor (2008), who measures differences between native and immigrants in 
the US along cultural and economic lines, we measure differences between men and females 
in Europe using as labour market performance indicators the activity rate, the employment 
rate and the type of contract (permanent vs. temporary, full-time vs. part time). Such an 
approach summarizes the large quantity of micro-level information available for different 
European  countries  and  across  time  in  a  way  that  eases  cross-country  comparisons. 
Technical details can be found in Appendix 1 of this report. In other words, the procedure 
predicts which individuals are females on the basis of observed characteristics and then uses 
this finding to measure the gap between men and females for a chosen outcome, such as the 
activity rate, by constructing a numeric index. The method requires no prior assumptions 
regarding  which  characteristics  are  most  effective  in  distinguishing  women  from  men. 
Moreover, the inclusion of irrelevant characteristics – that is, ones that do not actually help 
distinguish women from men – has no impact on the index. Such an index ranges between 0 
and 1. It can be interpreted as an index of dissimilarity: the larger the distance from 1, the 
more females are different from men along the inspected labour market indicator, controlling 
for other individual characteristics. 
We  construct  four  different  indices  capturing  gaps  between  women  and  men  in  labour 
market  participation  (activity  gap  index),  unemployment  (employment  gap  index), 
employment with a temporary contract (type of contract index 1) and employment with a 
part-time contract (type of contract index 2), which are detailed in Appendix 2.  
An important methodological achievement of our framework with respect to broad statistical 
analysis  of  labour  market  aggregate  indicators  lies  in  its  ability  to  separate  behavioural 
trends from that simply reflect changes in demographic and social characteristics of men and 
women across countries and over time. Indeed, changes in outcomes reflecting changes in 
preferences and beliefs over and above those stemming from natural demographic trends are 
of  particular  interest  for  policy  purposes.  Our  methodological  framework  uncovers 
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aggregate tendencies with the ability to control for a variety of confounding factors. In our 
analysis we control for differences in demographic factors using individual information on 
age  and  the  education  level  as  well  as  in  family  structure  using  marital  status,  partner 
education and number of children. 
The activity index, capturing differences between women and men inside and outside the 
labour market, reveals the behavioural differences more likely to come from the supply side 
of the labour market, whereas the employment index, focusing on gender differences for the 
individuals in the labour market only, captures the behavioural differences more likely to 
come from the demand side. The indices by type of contract are finally designed to uncover 
further differences within employment schemes. 
For each European country and each year between 1994-2000 (ECHP data) and  between 
2004-2009  (EU-SILC  data),  we  compute  the  four  different  indicators  and  perform  T-test 
statistics to assess significant difference between the begining and ending of the observed 
time window. The complete list of results is collected in Appendix 2, Tables A1-A4. 
In order to understand the ability of our framework to convey more precise information 
about women’s labour market performance as against the one revealed by the analysis of 
aggregate labour market indicators, we discuss our evidence in contrast to the facts that 
would  emerge  when  using  OECD  aggregate  data.  Figures  1-4  show  the  activity  rates, 
employment rate, permanent employment rates and full-time employment rates using the 
Labour  Force  Statistics  collected  by  OECD,  which  are  separated  by  gender.  Figures  5-8 
display the results of our analysis using our corresponding summary indicators of women-
men  gaps.  Countries  for  which  the  gaps  over  the  period  are  found  to  be  statistically 
insignificant are depicted using a constant line. 
Both sets of tables point towards the well-known onset of female labour participation and 
employment with a gender gap shrinking over time. However, a closer look at Figures 5-8 
reveals important cross-country differences that were not captured in Figures 1-4. It appears 
that  only  some  of  the  marked  trends  in  Figures  1-4  are  statistically  significant,  once  we 
control for changes in demographic and social characteristics between men and females over 
time. On the other hand, some of the less pronounced trends in Figures 1-4 turn out to be 
instead statistically significant using our methodology in Figures 5-8. It appears, for example, 
that  the  marked  change  in  female  employment  in  Figure  2  (OECD  aggregate  data)  in 
Belgium and Luxembourg is mainly due to demographic trends and other characteristics of 
the  female  labour  force  rather  than  to  changes  in  preferences  and  beliefs.  Indeed,  when 
controlling for these factors, i.e. when looking at the results obtained using our indicators 
(Figure 6) the changes in the employment gap between men and women in Belgium and 
Luxembourg are not statistically significant. On the other hand, minor differences emerging 
from  aggregate  data  can  reflect  important  behavioural  differences  if  other  characteristics 
remain roughly constant during the inspected period. For example, the weak increase in the 
female activity rate in Germany (Figure 1) seems to be an important trend in the observed 
period, with a male-female gap closing by about 20% (Figure 5). 
Let us now focus our attention on the information delivered by our different indices within 
countries. 
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Figure 9 plots our four summary indicators of dissimilarity between women’s and men's 
behaviour  for  each  country  and  over  time.  Interestingly,  the  picture  that  emerges  has 
features that are common to most European countries. Firstly, we find a marked increase in 
female labour market participation, which does not correspond to a similarly pronounced 
increase in employment rates. Secondly, there emerges a relevant increase in both temporary 
and  part-time  employment  of  women  compared  to  men.  This  is  an  important  fact  that 
deserves further investigation. Although these types of contracts can be chosen in certain 
circumstances, a larger incidence of temporary and part-time jobs for women can also reflect 
a transition phase towards the integration of such a group into permanent and full-time 
occupations. Distinguishing between those different explanations is a complex issue, which 
we cannot address here with the available data. Nevertheless, we continue our explorative 
analysis  to  document  in  which  countries  and  for  which  age  and  education  groups  the 
relationship between a higher female labour market participation and higher share of female 
temporary and part-time employment is stronger. 
 
Figure 1. Macro data trends in Europe: Activity rate by gender, 1994-2009 
 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
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Figure 2. Macro data trends in Europe: Employment rate by gender, 1994-2009 
 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
Figure 3. Macro data trends in Europe: Share of temporary jobs by gender, 1994-2009 
 
Source:  OECD Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
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Figure 4. Macro data trends in Europe: Share of part-time jobs by gender, 1994-2009 
 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
 
Figure 5. Micro-based gender gap index in activity rates, 1994-2009 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
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Figure 6. Micro-based gender gap index in unemployment rates, 1994-2009 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
 
Figure 7. Micro-based gender gap index in the share of part-time jobs, years 1994-2009 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
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Figure 8. Micro-based gender gap index in the share of temporary jobs, 1994-2009 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
Figure 9. Synthesis of micro-based gender gap indicators in the labour market in Europe, 
1994-2009 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
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Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
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Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
 
For this purpose, we follow Ferrera’s (1996) classification and split countries by institutional 
regimes,  distinguishing  between  the  traditional  four  groups:  liberal  countries  (the  UK), 
continental  countries  (Austria,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Germany,  Ireland 
and  France),  Nordic  countries  (Denmark,  Sweden  and  Finland)  and  southern  countries 
(Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy). Observe that, following Siaroff's (1994) intuition, Ireland 
is  included  among  later  female  mobilization  countries.  We  investigate  the  correlation 
between  female  labour  force  participation  and  type  of  employment  using  the  following 
baseline regression model: 
 
it i
j
EC
it ij j
EC
it
AC
it cty I r I I        

4
1
               (1) 
 
 where 
AC
it I  is the activity index of country i at time t, 
EC
it I  is the type of employment contract 
index of country i at time t (type of contract 1, i.e. temporary versus permanent, or 2, i.e. full 
time versus part time),  ij r  denotes dummy variables taking value 1 if country i is in regime j 
(j=1,...4) and 0 otherwise,  i cty  denotes country dummies and  it   is a random error term. 
Table 3 collects the OLS results. Column one and two report on the specifications including 
the two types of contract indicators separately whereas in the last column both indicators are 
included. Looking at column one, it appears that the countries where an increase in women’s 
labour market participation is significantly associated with a larger share of temporary jobs 
for  women  are  southern  European  countries.  Those  countries  are  also  the  ones  lagging 
behind the Nordic countries and the US in terms of women’s labour market participation 
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rates. Male-female participation gaps by the end of the 20th century in Greece, Spain and 
Italy were still around 30%, as opposed to 12.9% in the US. When the other indicator of type 
of  employment  is  taken  into  consideration  (column  two)  we  find  a  significant  negative 
association for all countries, except for the UK (in the liberal regime). 
This evidence thus depicts a picture of Europe where for those countries with higher rates of 
participation, i.e. the UK, a favourable trend in women’s labour market participation is also 
accompanied by a favourable trend in full-time employment. Whereas in the rest of Europe 
(with lower rates of participation), an increase in the number of women in the labour force 
(compared to men) comes at a cost of lower-quality jobs, i.e. of larger shares in temporary 
employment. 
Table  4  collects  the  results  that  are  obtained  when performing  the same  analysis  by age 
groups. It appears that these trends are driven by prime-age women (Table 4), while fewer 
and less pronounced correlations are revealed for old and young women. Finally, Table 5 
collects the results which are obtained by performing the same analysis when splitting our 
sample by education level. Interestingly, we find that these tendencies are not true for skilled 
women. The effects seem to be driven by women in the least skilled group (columns 1-3). 
Table 3. Activity rate, temporary employment and part-time employment 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
       
I_TEMP   -0.2512    -0.1317 
  (0.174)    (0.169) 
I_TEMP_2  0.1784    0.2115 
  (0.185)    (0.196) 
I_TEMP_3  -1.8602***    -1.7324*** 
  (0.293)    (0.272) 
I_TEMP_4  0.2663    0.1240 
  (0.177)    (0.173) 
I_PART    0.4442***  0.3899*** 
    (0.122)  (0.104) 
I_PART_2    -0.6954***  -0.6860*** 
    (0.154)  (0.166) 
I_PART_3    -2.4406***  -1.8006*** 
    (0.334)  (0.209) 
I_PART_4    -0.3919***  -0.3329*** 
    (0.124)  (0.109) 
Constant  0.9780***  2.8675***  4.1492*** 
  (0.031)  (0.301)  (0.262) 
       
Observations  171  171  171 
R-squared  0.788  0.757  0.819 
Notes: OLS results of model (1). Dep. Variable: Activity I. I_TEMP denotes the type of contract I temporary versus 
permanent, I_PART denotes the type of contract I full time versus part time. The subscript _2, _3, _4 indicates 
institutional regimes: _2 includes continental countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, 
Ireland and France), _3 Southern countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy), _3 Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland) and  the group of liberal countries (UK) is the reference category. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 WOMEN’S LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE: TRENDS AND SHAPING FACTORS | 17 
 
 
Table 4 Activity rate, temporary employment and part-time employment by age groups 
  Prime age  Old  Young 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
                   
I_TEMP   -0.2110    -0.1973  0.0647    0.0942  -0.0135    -0.0876 
  (0.201)    (0.200)  (0.097)    (0.072)  (0.068)    (0.247) 
I_TEMP_2  0.1059    0.3147  -0.0734    -0.1044  0.0362    0.0904 
  (0.215)    (0.238)  (0.101)    (0.079)  (0.071)    (0.248) 
I_TEMP_3  -2.3508***    -2.0609***  -0.1906    -0.2097*  -0.0764    -0.0113 
  (0.350)    (0.331)  (0.126)    (0.118)  (0.081)    (0.251) 
I_TEMP_4  0.2754    0.2354  -0.1681    -0.1855**  0.0312    0.1149 
  (0.205)    (0.206)  (0.104)    (0.077)  (0.071)    (0.249) 
I_PART    0.4607***  0.4491***    0.0796  0.0859**    0.0105  0.0601 
    (0.106)  (0.143)    (0.049)  (0.041)    (0.058)  (0.173) 
I_PART_2    -0.7658***  -0.8141***    -0.1454*  -0.1522**    0.0456  -0.0063 
    (0.151)  (0.210)    (0.076)  (0.072)    (0.064)  (0.176) 
I_PART_3    -2.5758***  -1.8683***    -0.2696  -0.1428    -0.0136  -0.1060 
    (0.366)  (0.292)    (0.169)  (0.184)    (0.092)  (0.187) 
I_PART_4    -0.3738***  -0.3809**    0.0221  -0.0065    -0.0284  -0.1017 
    (0.111)  (0.149)    (0.084)  (0.069)    (0.071)  (0.181) 
Constant  3.4631***  2.9840***  4.5391***  0.9945***  1.1227***  1.0373***  1.0655***  1.0123***  0.9352*** 
  (0.282)  (0.341)  (0.292)  (0.081)  (0.153)  (0.145)  (0.043)  (0.037)  (0.027) 
                   
Observations  171  171  171  171  171  171  171  171  171 
R-squared  0.756  0.718  0.792  0.807  0.806  0.810  0.451  0.445  0.460 
 
Notes: OLS results of model (1) by age groups. “Prime age” are individuals between  25-54, “Old” are individuals between  55-64, “Young” are individuals between  15-24.  Dep. 
Variable: Activity I. I_TEMP denotes the type of contract I temporary versus permanent, I_PART denotes the type of contract I full time versus part time. The subscript _2, _3, 
_4 indicates institutional regimes: _2 includes continental countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and France), _3 Southern countries 
(Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy), _3 Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and  the group of liberal countries (UK) is the reference category. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Activity rate, temporary employment and part-time employment by education level 
  Unskilled  Medium-skilled  Skilled 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
                   
I_TEMP   -0.0967    -0.0955  -0.0816*    0.0322  -0.1138    -0.0477 
  (0.124)    (0.396)  (0.046)    (0.072)  (0.089)    (0.206) 
I_TEMP_2  0.1276    0.1908  0.0846    0.2161*  0.2550*    0.1941 
  (0.158)    (0.417)  (0.072)    (0.121)  (0.135)    (0.229) 
I_TEMP_3  -0.7085***    -0.4538  -0.3161    -0.2608  -0.0672    -0.1354 
  (0.265)    (0.450)  (0.196)    (0.171)  (0.180)    (0.259) 
I_TEMP_4  0.0604    0.0717  0.1259**    -0.0061  0.0992    0.0253 
  (0.130)    (0.398)  (0.049)    (0.076)  (0.099)    (0.211) 
I_PART    0.1228  0.0018    -0.2452***  -0.2563***    0.1581  0.1296 
    (0.205)  (0.582)    (0.079)  (0.097)    (0.245)  (0.358) 
I_PART_2    -0.1936  -0.1218    0.0852  -0.0138    -0.1902  -0.1666 
    (0.214)  (0.589)    (0.093)  (0.122)    (0.249)  (0.360) 
I_PART_3    -1.7531***  -1.4816**    -0.5939***  -0.5410**    -0.2128  -0.1223 
    (0.279)  (0.619)    (0.208)  (0.223)    (0.292)  (0.390) 
I_PART_4    0.0819  0.1995    0.3073***  0.2978***    -0.1480  -0.1089 
    (0.210)  (0.584)    (0.082)  (0.101)    (0.247)  (0.359) 
Constant  1.6223***  2.4596***  2.7338***  1.0444***  0.9269***  1.9951***  1.0842***  1.0515***  0.9037* 
  (0.236)  (0.179)  (0.262)  (0.043)  (0.021)  (0.208)  (0.089)  (0.156)  (0.509) 
                   
Observations  171  171  171  171  171  171  171  171  171 
R-squared  0.808  0.833  0.841  0.802  0.836  0.850  0.596  0.589  0.597 
 
Notes: OLS results of model (1) by education levels. “Unskilled” are individuals with primary education only, “Medium-skilled” are individuals with secondary education only, 
“Skilled” are individuals with tertiary higher education. Dep. Variable: Activity I. I_TEMP denotes the type of contract I temporary versus permanent, I_PART denotes the type 
of contract I full time versus part time. The subscript _2, _3, _4 indicates institutional regimes: _2 includes continental countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Germany, Ireland and France), _3 Southern countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy), _3 Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and  the group of liberal 
countries (UK) is the reference category. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. WOMEN’S LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE: TRENDS AND SHAPING FACTORS | 19 
 
5.  Multivariate regression analysis 
5.1  The empirical strategy 
In  this  section,  we  use  multivariate  regression  analysis  to  look  at  the  determinants  of 
women’s labour market status and occupational characteristics. We estimate probit models 
for the probabilities of participating in the labour force, being employed, holding a fixed-
term  contract  and  working  part-time.  Indicating  individual  i  and  (discrete)  time  t  by 
corresponding subscripts, our basic regression model specifies the employment status as: 
ijt j jt t ijt ijt ijt cty cycle trend age y             X           (2) 
where  y  is  the  labour  market  status  (active,  employed  and  type  of  contract,  namely 
temporary  and  part-time)  at  time  t  for  individual  (female)  i  in  country  j,  X  is  a  set  of 
individual characteristics observed at time t, age are dummies for the age group of individual 
i  (25-34;  35-44;  45-54;  55-64)  capturing  cohort  effects,  cycle  is  a  business  cycle  indicator 
(country  specific  and  time  variant),  trend  is  a  common  linear  trend  and  cty  are  country 
dummies. 
In order to investigate the differences in women’s labour market behaviour across countries 
with different welfare-regimes (which also partly reflect differences in cultural attitudes to 
female labour market participation), we follow the classification used in the previous section 
and divide countries of our sample into four major groups: southern (Spain, Italy, Greece 
and  Portugal),  Social  Democratic  (Sweden,  Finland  and  Denmark),  liberal  (the  United 
Kingdom) and continental (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Luxembourg).  The  welfare  regime  is  then  included  among  the  observed  determinants  of 
women's labour market performance according to the following specification: 
 
    ijt j t j ijt j
i j jt t ijt ijt ijt
welfare trend welfare welfare
age welfare cycle trend age y
   
    
     
      
X
X
        (3) 
where    i j age welfare    captures  differences  across  welfare  regimes  in  the  age-effects  of 
individual  i  (e.g.  individuals  of  the  same  age  group  may  behave  differently  in  different 
welfare regimes);    ijt j welfare X   captures the effect of the welfare regimes on the attitude 
towards work of women with certain characteristics (e.g. does the number of children affect 
differently  the  participation  rate  of  women  in  countries  like  Italy  and  Sweden?); 
  t j trend welfare    captures  changes  over  time  of  the  labour  market  status  of  women  in 
countries characterized by different welfare regimes. 
Finally we account for changes over time in women’s attitude to work by estimating the 
following  model  where  the  trend  indicator  is  interacted  with  the  relevant  individual 
characteristics: 
    ijt j ijt t i t jt t ijt ijt ijt cty trend age trend cycle trend age y                   X X   (4) 
 where    ijt t trend X   captures changes over time in the labour market status of women with 
certain  characteristics  (e.g.  does  the  participation  rate  of  women  with  a  high  level  of 
education change in 2007 with respect to 1994?). Specification 4 is run both for the pooled 
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5.2  Results 
5.2.1  Baseline model 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of specification 2 and provides the impacts of the 
variables of interests on the probability of participating (column 1), being employed (column 
2), holding a fixed-term contract (column 3) and working part-time (column 4). 
Table 6. Female labour market participation and type of occupation 
                         
   active  employed  temporary  parttime 
  Coef.   
Std. 
Err.  Coef.   
Std. 
Err.  Coef.   
Std. 
Err.  Coef.   
Std. 
Err. 
Marital status                             
Single                             
incouple  -0.071  ***  0.003  -0.044  ***  0.003  -0.021  ***  0.003  0.095  ***  0.004 
separated  0.057  ***  0.007  0.055  ***  0.007  -0.018  ***  0.006  0.019  **  0.009 
divorced  0.050  ***  0.004  0.029  ***  0.004  -0.014  ***  0.004  -0.016  ***  0.005 
widowed  -0.067  ***  0.006  -0.031  ***  0.006  -0.012  **  0.005  0.066  ***  0.008 
Children                             
No children                             
children  -0.038  ***  0.003  -0.031  ***  0.003  0.013  ***  0.003  0.019  ***  0.004 
child  0.043  ***  0.005  0.043  ***  0.005  -0.005     0.005  0.014  **  0.006 
child03  -0.174  ***  0.004  -0.162  ***  0.003  -0.018  ***  0.003  0.140  ***  0.005 
child36  -0.088  ***  0.003  -0.088  ***  0.003  0.007  **  0.003  0.142  ***  0.004 
child614  -0.067  ***  0.003  -0.066  ***  0.003  0.023  ***  0.002  0.166  ***  0.003 
Co-habiting 
Elderly                             
no_elderly                             
old70-80  -0.068  ***  0.005  -0.075  ***  0.005  0.012  ***  0.005  0.009     0.007 
old80  -0.025  ***  0.006  -0.015  **  0.006  -0.011  **  0.006  0.002     0.009 
Education                             
Low skilled                             
ISCED35  0.122  ***  0.002  0.145  ***  0.002  -0.062  ***  0.002  -0.044  ***  0.003 
ISCED57  0.214  ***  0.003  0.253  ***  0.003  -0.067  ***  0.002  -0.104  ***  0.003 
pISCED03  -0.016  ***  0.003  0.006  *  0.003  0.010  ***  0.003  -0.016  ***  0.004 
pISCED35  0.039  ***  0.003  0.064  ***  0.003  -0.031  ***  0.003  0.007  *  0.004 
pISCED57  0.018  ***  0.004  0.050  ***  0.004  -0.037  ***  0.003  0.011  ***  0.004 
Age                             
Age_25-34                             
age_35_44  0.052  ***  0.003  0.067  ***  0.003  -0.077  ***  0.002  0.024  ***  0.003 
age_45_54  -0.013  ***  0.003  0.013  ***  0.003  -0.113  ***  0.003  0.056  ***  0.004 
age_55_64  -0.295  ***  0.004  -0.247  ***  0.004  -0.128  ***  0.002  0.132  ***  0.005 
Macro                             
trend  0.012  ***  0.001  0.014  ***  0.001  0.002  ***  0.001  0.003  ***  0.001 
cycle  0.003  ***  0.001  0.005  ***  0.001  0.001  ***  0.001  0.005  ***  0.001 
UK                             
DK  0.075  ***  0.005  0.050  ***  0.005  -0.171  ***  0.002  -0.170  ***  0.004 
NL  -0.039  ***  0.004  -0.038  ***  0.004  0.169  ***  0.009  0.311  ***  0.005 WOMEN’S LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE: TRENDS AND SHAPING FACTORS | 21 
 
BE  0.018  ***  0.004  -0.058  ***  0.004  0.166  ***  0.008  0.047  ***  0.005 
FR  0.078  ***  0.004  0.019  ***  0.004  0.179  ***  0.008  -0.085  ***  0.004 
IE  -0.046  ***  0.005  -0.061  ***  0.006  0.106  ***  0.009  0.036  ***  0.007 
IT  -0.077  ***  0.004  -0.116  ***  0.004  0.197  ***  0.007  -0.094  ***  0.004 
GR  -0.041  ***  0.004  -0.100  ***  0.005  0.353  ***  0.009  -0.164  ***  0.005 
ES  0.012  ***  0.004  -0.070  ***  0.004  0.391  ***  0.008  -0.160  ***  0.004 
PT  0.159  ***  0.004  0.109  ***  0.005  0.206  ***  0.009  -0.282  ***  0.004 
AT  -0.053  ***  0.004  -0.085  ***  0.004  0.059  ***  0.007  0.018  ***  0.005 
FI  0.072  ***  0.004  0.019  ***  0.004  0.264  ***  0.009  -0.224  ***  0.004 
SE  0.100  ***  0.004  0.076  ***  0.004  0.203  ***  0.009  -0.057  ***  0.004 
DE  0.005     0.004  -0.068  ***  0.004  0.154  ***  0.008  0.137  ***  0.005 
LU  -0.040  ***  0.006  -0.053  ***  0.006  0.038  ***  0.009  -0.014  *  0.007 
Observations  818168      818168      427128      492929     
Log likelihood  -432848.6     
-
473241.1     
-
179740.1     
-
285804.1     
pseudo - R2  0.148      0.128      0.113      0.128     
 
Not surprisingly, the results reported in columns (1) and (2) are qualitative the same, with 
some differences in the magnitude of the impacts. While activity rates are widely used as an 
indicator of labour market involvement, it is increasingly recognized that employment and 
hours  worked  are  the  key  indicators  for  assessing  women’s  labour  market  integration 
(Jonung & Persson, 1993). One reason is that women’s unemployment is often hidden among 
those defined as inactive because of the low work attachment of women holding to some 
specific groups (typically low-skilled women with young children). Considering the impact 
of  household  and  personal  characteristics  on  women’s  labour  market  status  (active  and 
employed), the results are in line with those reported in the previous empirical literature. 
Being  married  is  negatively  related  to  women’s  participation  and  employment.  Children 
have a negative impact on female participation and the effect is significantly stronger in 
presence of children under 4 years of age. Participation (and employment) goes up gradually 
when the child starts attending school and the child effect reduces significantly only when he 
or  she  attends  secondary  school  (around  14  years).  Also  the  number  of  children  has  a 
significant  disincentive  effect  on  labour  market  participation.  Note  that  the  reported 
coefficients should not be interpreted as casual effects, as both participation and fertility may 
be simultaneous decisions. This implies that the casual effect of children on participation can 
be lower than that estimated. 
In the face of the ongoing dramatic development of the aging population in Europe, we also 
include a dummy for the presence in the household of an elderly person above the age of 70 
as a proxy for elder care burden.5 
In many countries the responsibility of providing care for elderly persons is likely to fall on 
families, and in practice on women. Moreover, the choice of having an elderly relative living 
in the household is a better proxy of care burdens than having children. This variable is 
indeed less affected by endogeneity issues that may arise in the estimation as a consequence 
of the possible inverse causal relationship between labour market status and the rational 
choice of having a child (Cipollone & D’Ippoliti, 2011). As expected, the estimated impact of 
                                                   
5 Ettner (1995) points out that, although the decision to care for a senior person and the decision of 
fertility  differ  in  many  aspects,  the  influence  of  the  commitment  to  caring  for  the  elderly  can  be 
studied similarly to the commitment towards children. 22 | CIPOLLONE, PATACCHINI & VALLANTI 
 
elderly care responsibilities on both participation and employment status is negative and 
significant. 
Education is also another important determinant of the female labour market status. Within 
the context of our model, the control for education is mainly a proxy for the wage rate. 
According to our estimates, a high level of education leads to more participation. The level of 
education  of  the  partner  has  also  a  significant  impact  on  female  participation  and 
employment: the coefficients of the dummies for secondary education and tertiary education 
are indeed positive and highly significant. Finally the age effects show the familiar hump-
shaped  pattern  in  both  the  participation  and  employment,  implying  an  increase  in  the 
probability of participating for the age group 35-44, and then a lower probability for older 
groups. Notice that the probability of being employed is significantly lower only for women 
in the old group (55-64), while the turning point for participation occurs earlier in the life-
cycle. 
After controlling for personal characteristics and country unobserved time invariant effects, 
the trend indicator is positive and significant for both the probability of being employed and 
being in the labour force, implying that on average, the probabilities of participating and 
being employed in 2009 are 0.18  and 0.20 percent higher than in 1994 respectively. 
Columns (3) and (4) provide estimates of the impact of personal/household characteristics 
on the probability of holding a fixed-term contract and working part-time. Temporary work 
is more frequent among single women and women without children. Among women with 
kids,  the  incidence  of  temporary  workers  is  larger  for  those  who  have  children  in  pre-
primary (3-6 age old) and primary education (6-14 age old). Temporary work arrangements 
are more likely for women with a low level of education and for women with a partner with 
a low level of education. Finally, the probability of holding a fixed-term contract declines 
with  age,  and  this  is  in  line  with  evidence  for  Europe  which  suggests  that  the  share  of 
temporary contracts is much higher in the inflow of newly-created jobs than in the existing 
stock.6 
Regarding part-time employment (column 4), the results show that part-time among women 
is  largely  explained  by  family  ties,  the  incidence  being  significantly  higher  for  married 
women with small children. It declines with women’s education levels and, interestingly, 
increases with the partner’s level of education as the presence of a higher family income 
make women more willing to accept a reduction in worked hours in order to reconcile paid 
activity  and  unpaid  domestic  labour.  Differently  from  temporary  employment,  the 
probability of holding a part-time job increases with age. 
5.2.2  Female labour market outcomes and welfare regimes 
Table  7  reports  the  results  of model  3,  in  which  the  coefficients  of  the  probit  model  are 
allowed to vary across countries characterized by different welfare regimes (the base group 
is the UK). 
                                                   
6 See Blanchard & Landier (2002) for France and Dolado et al. (2002) and Guell & Petrongolo (2007) for 
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Table 7. Female labour market participation and type of occupation: Welfare regimes 
                         
   active  employed  temporary  parttime 
  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err. 
Marital status                             
Single                             
incouple  -0.020  ***  0.008  -0.011     0.008  -0.010     0.015  0.146  ***  0.009 
separated  0.046  ***  0.007  0.038  ***  0.007  -0.020  ***  0.006  0.044  ***  0.009 
divorced  0.042  ***  0.004  0.027  ***  0.005  -0.018  ***  0.004  -0.003     0.005 
widowed  -0.073  ***  0.005  -0.040  ***  0.006  -0.016  ***  0.005  0.092  ***  0.008 
married*dem  0.004     0.009  0.002     0.010  -0.036  ***  0.014  -0.122  ***  0.009 
married*cont  -0.075  ***  0.009  -0.045  ***  0.010  -0.024     0.015  -0.032  ***  0.010 
married*south  -0.063  ***  0.009  -0.048  ***  0.010  -0.013     0.015  -0.119  ***  0.010 
Children                             
No children                             
children  -0.034  ***  0.003  -0.029  ***  0.003  0.016  ***  0.003  0.020  ***  0.004 
child  0.074  ***  0.008  0.071  ***  0.008  -0.007     0.014  0.019  **  0.010 
child*dem  0.009     0.009  0.011     0.009  -0.010     0.015  -0.057  ***  0.009 
child*cont  -0.018  **  0.008  -0.015  *  0.009  -0.010     0.014  0.009     0.009 
child*south  -0.045  ***  0.008  -0.049  ***  0.009  0.016     0.015  -0.038  ***  0.009 
child03  -0.239  ***  0.010  -0.228  ***  0.010  -0.011     0.019  0.285  ***  0.014 
child03*dem  0.055  ***  0.011  0.061  ***  0.012  0.002     0.022  -0.161  ***  0.011 
child03*cont  0.020  *  0.011  0.031  ***  0.012  -0.015     0.020  -0.139  ***  0.011 
child03*south  0.156  ***  0.008  0.158  ***  0.010  -0.002     0.020  -0.164  ***  0.010 
child36  -0.157  ***  0.009  -0.157  ***  0.009  0.003     0.017  0.246  ***  0.013 
child36*dem  0.136  ***  0.009  0.135  ***  0.010  0.000     0.019  -0.119  ***  0.011 
child36*cont  0.075  ***  0.010  0.066  ***  0.011  -0.006     0.018  -0.081  ***  0.012 
child36*south  0.098  ***  0.009  0.110  ***  0.010  0.015     0.019  -0.143  ***  0.010 
child614  -0.117  ***  0.007  -0.114  ***  0.007  0.040  ***  0.014  0.234  ***  0.009 
child614*dem  0.134  ***  0.008  0.135  ***  0.009  -0.024  *  0.013  -0.120  ***  0.008 24 | CIPOLLONE, PATACCHINI & VALLANTI 
 
child614*cont  0.055  ***  0.008  0.052  ***  0.009  -0.021  *  0.013  -0.036  ***  0.009 
child614*south  0.070  ***  0.007  0.071  ***  0.008  -0.010     0.013  -0.139  ***  0.008 
Co-habiting Elderly                             
noelderly                             
old7080  -0.166  ***  0.019  -0.159  ***  0.019  -0.002     0.042  -0.029     0.028 
old7080*dem  0.017     0.022  0.019     0.024  0.013     0.052  0.058     0.038 
old7080*con  0.027     0.021  0.031     0.022  0.019     0.047  0.013     0.034 
old7080*south  0.122  ***  0.016  0.105  ***  0.018  0.013     0.044  0.027     0.031 
old80  -0.075  ***  0.028  -0.069  **  0.029  -0.041     0.060  -0.057  *  0.034 
old80*dem  -0.049     0.039  -0.053     0.040  0.106     0.112  0.018     0.055 
old80*cont  0.033     0.030  0.042     0.032  0.047     0.085  0.025     0.044 
old80*south  0.069  ***  0.025  0.061  **  0.028  0.050     0.082  0.065     0.041 
Education                             
Low skilled                             
ISCED35  0.167  ***  0.007  0.186  ***  0.008  0.020     0.021  -0.051  ***  0.011 
ISCED35*dem  -0.058  ***  0.010  -0.056  ***  0.010  -0.007     0.021  0.072  ***  0.014 
ISCED35*cont  -0.073  ***  0.009  -0.062  ***  0.009  -0.062  ***  0.018  0.010     0.013 
ISCED35*south  -0.077  ***  0.009  -0.067  ***  0.009  -0.088  ***  0.015  0.029  **  0.012 
ISCED57  0.221  ***  0.008  0.253  ***  0.008  0.073  ***  0.022  -0.111  ***  0.011 
ISCED57*dem  -0.052  ***  0.011  -0.037  ***  0.011  -0.050  ***  0.018  0.045  ***  0.014 
ISCED57*cont  -0.039  ***  0.010  -0.012     0.010  -0.110  ***  0.015  -0.002     0.013 
ISCED57*south  0.009     0.009  0.002     0.010  -0.112  ***  0.013  0.067  ***  0.013 
pISCED03  0.030  ***  0.010  0.039  ***  0.011  -0.053  ***  0.019  -0.055  ***  0.013 
pISCED03*dem  0.036  ***  0.013  0.036  ***  0.013  0.054  **  0.028  0.100  ***  0.017 
pISCED03*cont  -0.032  ***  0.013  -0.006     0.013  0.057  **  0.027  0.050  ***  0.017 
pISCED03*south  -0.078  ***  0.013  -0.067  ***  0.013  0.080  ***  0.027  0.093  ***  0.016 
pISCED35  0.074  ***  0.008  0.091  ***  0.009  -0.052  ***  0.015  -0.043  ***  0.010 
pISCED35*dem  0.013     0.011  0.017     0.011  0.035  *  0.020  0.090  ***  0.013 
pISCED35*cont  -0.031  ***  0.010  -0.016     0.011  0.027     0.019  0.075  ***  0.013 
pISCED35*south  -0.097  ***  0.011  -0.085  ***  0.011  0.030     0.019  0.096  ***  0.013 
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pISCED57*dem  0.039  ***  0.011  0.052  ***  0.011  0.001     0.018  0.094  ***  0.014 
pISCED57*cont  -0.025  **  0.011  0.005     0.011  -0.002     0.017  0.130  ***  0.013 
pISCED57*south  -0.045  ***  0.011  -0.021  **  0.011  -0.014     0.016  0.084  ***  0.014 
Age                         
Age25-34                         
35-44  0.042  ***  0.009  0.047  ***  0.009  -0.050  ***  0.014  0.056  ***  0.011 
45-54  -0.045  ***  0.010  -0.040  ***  0.010  -0.054  ***  0.015  0.119  ***  0.011 
55-64  -0.271  ***  0.011  -0.252  ***  0.010  -0.040  **  0.017  0.259  ***  0.012 
(35-44)*dem  0.043  ***  0.010  0.040  ***  0.011  -0.047  ***  0.014  -0.041  ***  0.012 
(45-54)*dem  0.133  ***  0.010  0.139  ***  0.011  -0.057  ***  0.015  -0.083  ***  0.012 
(55-64)*dem  0.140  ***  0.010  0.154  ***  0.011  -0.091  ***  0.013  -0.098  ***  0.012 
(35-44)*cont  0.022  **  0.010  0.013     0.011  -0.046  ***  0.014  -0.009     0.012 
(45-54)*cont  0.059  ***  0.011  0.054  ***  0.012  -0.067  ***  0.014  -0.031  ***  0.012 
(55-64)*cont  -0.016     0.012  -0.021  *  0.012  -0.091  ***  0.014  -0.092  ***  0.012 
(35-44)*south  -0.018  *  0.010  0.015     0.010  -0.023     0.014  -0.036  ***  0.011 
(45-54)*south  0.001     0.011  0.059  ***  0.011  -0.073  ***  0.013  -0.097  ***  0.011 
(55-64)*south  -0.052  ***  0.011  0.019  *  0.011  -0.112  ***  0.012  -0.167  ***  0.010 
Macro                             
trend  0.008  ***  0.002  0.010  ***  0.002  0.004     0.005  0.011  ***  0.002 
trend*dem  0.000     0.002  0.002     0.002  0.005     0.005  0.003     0.003 
trend*cont  0.004  *  0.002  0.005  **  0.002  0.003     0.005  0.008  ***  0.003 
trend*south  0.002     0.002  0.001     0.002  -0.004     0.005  -0.007  ***  0.003 
cycle  0.003  ***  0.001  0.005  ***  0.001  0.003  ***  0.001  0.008  ***  0.001 
Liberal                             
Democratic  -0.038     0.031  -0.110  ***  0.030  0.186  **  0.088  -0.067  *  0.035 
Continental  0.040     0.029  -0.072  **  0.030  0.237  ***  0.059  -0.020     0.035 
Southern  0.038     0.027  -0.063  **  0.030  0.462  ***  0.058  0.079  **  0.034 
Observations  818168      818168      427128      492929     
Log likelihood  -432852      -473874.9      -184200.2      -293087.0     
pseudo - R2  0.148        0.127        0.091ù        0.105       26 | CIPOLLONE, PATACCHINI & VALLANTI 
 
The marital status has a larger negative impact on women’s labour market involvement in 
those  countries  characterized  by  more  traditional  family  structure,  such  as  found  in 
continental and southern countries. The presence of young children has a negative impact on 
both participation and employment rates regardless the welfare regimes, though with some 
important differences in the magnitude of the effects. It is in the UK that the age of the latest 
child appears to be most critical, while in the southern countries, which are also the countries 
with lower employment rates for mothers, the age of the youngest child has a lower impact 
on  both  participation  and  employment.  This  may  be  simply  due  to  differences  in  the 
composition of the labour force. In countries where female labour force participation is low, 
women in employment are typically characterized by a higher level of education – implying 
a stronger labour market attachment. Moreover in countries such as Italy, Greece and Spain, 
family networks compensate for the lack of availability of the service system. For example, 
extended  family  members,  normally  grandparents,  often  provide  child  care  services, 
allowing the mother to continue work when their children are young due to the limited 
services provided by publicly-funded daycare facilities. Finally, labour market institutional 
rigidities in southern countries – which make (re)entering the labour market more difficult 
after a period of temporary leave – may stimulate higher continuity in work attachment. This 
difficulty  in  re-entering  the  market  seems  to  be  confirmed  by  the  evidence  that  while 
mothers’ participation and employment increase steadily as the youngest child grows up 
(mostly through a re-entry to part-time employment mainly in Social Democratic countries 
but  also  in  the  UK  and  continental  Europe),  in  the  southern  countries  the  presence  of 
children negatively affects female labour market integration, even when the child is of school 
age. The estimates show that the probability of participating (being employed) for women’s 
with a child older than 14 in the south of Europe is almost 5 percentage points lower than in 
the  UK  and  Social  Democratic  countries,  and  2  percentage  lower  than  in  continental 
countries. 
The impact of an elderly relative at home on labour behaviour is found to depend on the 
cultural attitudes towards elderly relatives. In fact, while the overall effects of elder care is 
negative  despite  the  welfare  regime  we  consider,  it  is  much  lower  in southern  countries 
where co-habiting with an elderly relative is a quite diffuse practice and it is not necessarily 
related to the need of providing care to senior persons. 
Finally, the highest female participation (and employment) rate is found among those aged 
in  their  late  30s/early  40s  in  all  the  welfare  regimes  groups  we  consider.  However  the 
decline in women involvement occurs at a later stage of the life cycle in Social Democratic 
and continental countries. Moreover, the participation (employment) gap between old-aged 
women  (55-64)  and  younger  groups  is  significantly  larger  in  southern  countries.  This  is 
explained both by cultural reasons (older women are of a generation in which low female 
labour market involvement is expected as part of a male breadwinner system) and by the 
presence of early retirement pension schemes which favoured an early drop-out. In column 
(3)  we  report  the  results  concerning  the  differences  across  welfare  regimes  of  female 
temporary  occupation.  After  controlling  for  individual  characteristics  we  notice  that  the 
incidence of temporary contracts is much higher in Southern countries and, to a less extent, 
in continental and Social Democratic countries than in the UK. Moreover, countries in the 
south of Europe exhibit also a positive trend over the last 15 years. The most striking cross-
countries difference in the personal characteristics of women holding fixed-term positions is 
the level of education. While in the UK and Social Democratic countries women with higher 
educational  qualifications  are  more  likely  to  hold  fixed-term  contracts,  this  tendency  is 
reversed in the southern and continental Europe. This suggests the different nature of fixed-
temporary  contracts  in  the  two groups  of  countries:  they  are  more  likely  to  be  stepping WOMEN’S LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE: TRENDS AND SHAPING FACTORS | 27 
 
stones towards permanent high-skilled jobs in the former, and cheaper options, with lower 
wages and severance payments, and poor human capital accumulation in the latter. 
Regarding  part-time  incidence  (column  4),  the  results  show  that  part-time  occupation  is 
mainly an option for married women with kids regardless of the welfare regimes, although 
the presence of small children has a strong impact on part-time decisions in the UK rather 
than in the other countries. Once we control for the presence of children, the incidence of 
part time jobs differs across age groups with a larger share of part-timers in the older groups 
in the UK, and to a less extent in continental and Social Democratic countries. Differences 
across age groups appear to be much less marked in the southern regime where, differently 
from the other countries in the sample, the incidence of part-time jobs drops significantly for 
women in the oldest age group (55-64). 
5.2.3  Trends across welfare regimes 
In Table 8, we report the estimated coefficients of specification 4, in which we allow the 
impact of the main determinants of female labour behaviour to vary over time. Tables 9 and 
10 show the results for participation and employment using the same specification as in 
Table 3, estimated for each welfare regime separately. 
Overall,  the  evidence  shows  that  the  positive  trends  in  both  female  employment  and 
participation  differ  substantially  depending  on the  personal  and  family  characteristics  of 
women. Over time, the participation/employment increases for women with small children. 
However, such increase is not uniform across welfare regimes. From the results reported in 
Tables  9  and  10,  it  emerges  that,  between  1994  and  2009,  the  negative  impact  of  young 
children on women’s labour market involvement declined significantly in Social Democratic 
countries and to a lesser extent in continental and southern countries, while no trend has 
been detected for the UK. This phenomenon may be partly related to a larger availability of 
market  (childcare  services)  or  non-market  substitutes  (husband's  or  relative’s  help  in 
childcare activities) accompanied by a shift in people’s values in all European countries, and 
to  a  larger  extent  in  more  traditional  countries,  from  the  traditional  breadwinner 
arrangements in favour of a more equal role for men and women within the household. This 
change in the attitude of women with children towards work has also been favoured by the 
expansion of flexible forms of employment (fixed-term contracts and part-time jobs), albeit 
from different starting points, which have allowed mothers to better combine traditional 
family responsibilities such as child-rearing with paid work. 
The negative impact of informal elderly care on employment and participation has increased 
over time (with the exception of Social Democratic countries). According to our results, the 
presence of a co-inhabitation elderly person has a positive (and significant) impact on female 
labour  market  involvement  at  the  beginning  of  the  sample  period  and  then  turns  to  be 
negative. This seems to be related to the changing role of elderly relatives within the family, 
from providers of unpaid help within extended family models to recipients of informal long-
term care in the nuclear family (Leitner, 2003; Saraceno, 2010, Saraceno & Naldini, 2007). 
Education  (and  partner's  education)  appears  to  have  an  increasing  role  in  stimulating 
women’s  labour  market  involvement.  Tables  4  and  5  show  that  the  estimated  trend  is 
positive in both participation and employment in Continental countries. We also estimate a 
significant increase in the share of highly educated women leaving the inactivity status in the 
UK, and leaving the unemployment status in the Southern countries. 28 | CIPOLLONE, PATACCHINI & VALLANTI 
 
Table 8. Female labour market participation and type of occupation: Trends 
                         
   active  employed  temporary  parttime 
  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err. 
Marital status                             
Single                             
incouple  -0.041  **  0.021  -0.021     0.022  -0.005     0.020  0.060  **  0.025 
separated  0.056  ***  0.007  0.055  ***  0.007  -0.017  ***  0.006  0.019  **  0.009 
divorced  0.049  ***  0.004  0.029  ***  0.005  -0.014  ***  0.004  -0.016  ***  0.005 
widowed  -0.067  ***  0.006  -0.032  ***  0.006  -0.011  **  0.005  0.066  ***  0.008 
Children                             
No children                             
children  -0.038  ***  0.003  -0.032  ***  0.003  0.013  ***  0.003  0.020  ***  0.004 
childd  0.052  ***  0.016  0.046  ***  0.017  0.000     0.017  -0.034     0.021 
child03d  -0.160  ***  0.026  -0.120  ***  0.026  -0.050  ***  0.020  0.012     0.033 
child36d  -0.133  ***  0.024  -0.126  ***  0.024  0.003     0.022  0.066  **  0.029 
child614d  -0.046  ***  0.018  -0.042  **  0.018  0.034  **  0.018  0.008     0.021 
trend*child  -0.001     0.001  0.000     0.001  0.000     0.001  0.004  **  0.002 
trend*child03  -0.001     0.002  -0.003     0.002  0.003     0.002  0.010  ***  0.003 
trend*child36  0.004  *  0.002  0.003     0.002  0.000     0.002  0.006  ***  0.002 
trend*child614  -0.002     0.001  -0.002     0.001  -0.001     0.001  0.012  ***  0.002 
Co-habiting Elderly                             
no elderly                             
old7080  0.063  **  0.032  0.031     0.035  0.035     0.035  -0.083  *  0.048 
old80  -0.082  *  0.043  -0.062     0.044  0.121  **  0.052  -0.023     0.061 
trend*old7080  -0.010  ***  0.003  -0.008  ***  0.003  -0.002     0.003  0.008  *  0.004 
trend*old80  0.004     0.003  0.004     0.003  -0.009  ***  0.003  0.002     0.005 
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Low skilled                             
ISCED35  0.086  ***  0.016  0.074  ***  0.017  -0.079  ***  0.016  -0.033     0.023 
ISCED57  0.152  ***  0.019  0.129  ***  0.021  -0.053  ***  0.017  0.003     0.025 
trend*ISCED35  0.003  **  0.001  0.006  ***  0.001  0.001     0.001  -0.001     0.002 
trend*ISCED57  0.005  ***  0.002  0.010  ***  0.002  -0.001     0.001  -0.009  ***  0.002 
pISCED03  -0.056  **  0.025  -0.036     0.025  0.041  *  0.024  -0.063  **  0.030 
pISCED35  -0.058  **  0.024  -0.043  *  0.024  -0.002     0.023  0.008     0.029 
pISCED57  -0.064  ***  0.026  -0.029     0.026  0.039     0.027  0.028     0.030 
trend*pISCED03  0.003  *  0.002  0.003  *  0.002  -0.002     0.002  0.004     0.002 
trend*pISCED35  0.008  ***  0.002  0.009  ***  0.002  -0.002     0.002  0.000     0.002 
trend*pISCED57  0.006  ***  0.002  0.006  ***  0.002  -0.006  ***  0.002  -0.001     0.002 
Age                             
25-34                             
35-44  -0.042  **  0.021  0.006     0.022  -0.093  ***  0.016  0.026     0.025 
45-54  -0.157  ***  0.023  -0.085  ***  0.023  -0.170  ***  0.015  -0.010     0.028 
55-64  -0.455  ***  0.020  -0.383  ***  0.021  -0.128  ***  0.016  0.087  ***  0.033 
trend*(35-44)  0.008  ***  0.002  0.005  ***  0.002  0.002     0.001  0.000     0.002 
trend*(45-54)  0.012  ***  0.002  0.008  ***  0.002  0.006  ***  0.002  0.005  **  0.002 
trend*(55-64)  0.013  ***  0.002  0.011  ***  0.002  0.000     0.002  0.004     0.003 
Macro                             
trend  0.000     0.002  0.001     0.002  0.003  **  0.002  -0.004     0.002 
cycle  0.003  ***  0.001  0.005  ***  0.001  0.002  ***  0.001  0.005  ***  0.001 
Observations  818168      818168      427128      492929     
Log likelihood  -432641.4      -473009.5      -125878.3      -282816.9     
pseudo - R2  0.148        0.128        0.087        0.129       
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Table 9. Female  activity rate: Trends and welfare regimes 
Active  ALL  LIBERAL  CONTINENTAL  DEMOCRATIC  SOUTHERN 
  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err. 
Marital status                                    
Single                                    
incouple  -0.041  **  0.021  -0.034     0.073  -0.060  *  0.035  0.023     0.031  -0.029     0.032 
separated  0.056  ***  0.007  0.022     0.017  0.055  ***  0.017  -0.003     0.023  0.088  ***  0.009 
divorced  0.049  ***  0.004  0.036  ***  0.013  0.033  ***  0.007  -0.012  *  0.007  0.111  ***  0.008 
widowed  -0.067  ***  0.006  0.016     0.013  -0.094  ***  0.010  -0.021  *  0.012  -0.090  ***  0.007 
Children                                    
No children                                    
children  -0.038  ***  0.003  -0.026  **  0.012  -0.036  ***  0.005  -0.035  ***  0.006  -0.032  ***  0.004 
childd  0.052  ***  0.016  0.047     0.067  0.133  ***  0.027  0.122  ***  0.026  0.002     0.022 
child03d  -0.160  ***  0.026  -0.272  ***  0.092  -0.263  ***  0.044  -0.354  ***  0.053  -0.064  *  0.034 
child36d  -0.133  ***  0.024  -0.209  **  0.090  -0.201  ***  0.042  0.027     0.037  -0.110  ***  0.031 
child614d  -0.046  ***  0.018  -0.118  *  0.069  -0.047     0.032  0.003     0.033  -0.069  ***  0.023 
trend*child  -0.001     0.001  0.001     0.005  -0.006  ***  0.002  -0.004  *  0.002  0.002     0.002 
trend*child03  -0.001     0.002  0.001     0.007  0.003     0.003  0.011  ***  0.003  0.000     0.003 
trend*child36  0.004  *  0.002  0.003     0.007  0.009  ***  0.003  -0.002     0.003  0.005  *  0.002 
trend*child614  -0.002     0.001  0.000     0.005  -0.001     0.003  0.002     0.003  0.001     0.002 
Co-habiting Elderly                                    
no elderly                                    
old7080  0.063  **  0.032  -0.174     0.179  0.051     0.078  -0.151     0.110  0.059  *  0.035 
old80  -0.082  *  0.043  -0.025     0.248  -0.166     0.119  -0.007     0.155  -0.064     0.046 
trend*old7080  -0.010  ***  0.003  0.000     0.013  -0.014  **  0.007  0.000     0.007  -0.007  **  0.003 
trend*old80  0.004     0.003  -0.004     0.019  0.010     0.009  -0.007     0.012  0.004     0.004 
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Low skilled                                    
ISCED35  0.086  ***  0.016  0.128  *  0.067  0.016     0.031  0.082  ***  0.031  0.112  ***  0.021 
ISCED57  0.152  ***  0.019  0.106     0.074  0.045     0.036  0.108  ***  0.033  0.252  ***  0.025 
trend*ISCED35  0.003  **  0.001  0.004     0.006  0.006  ***  0.002  0.001     0.003  0.001     0.002 
trend*ISCED57  0.005  ***  0.002  0.010  *  0.006  0.011  ***  0.003  0.003     0.003  0.000     0.002 
pISCED03  -0.056  **  0.025  -0.009     0.099  0.019     0.045  0.000     0.044  -0.073  **  0.033 
pISCED35  -0.058  **  0.024  0.065     0.076  0.001     0.039  -0.015     0.039  -0.106  ***  0.035 
pISCED57  -0.064  ***  0.026  0.028     0.080  -0.059     0.042  -0.026     0.043  -0.018     0.039 
trend*pISCED03  0.003  *  0.002  0.003     0.008  -0.001     0.004  0.004     0.004  0.003     0.003 
trend*pISCED35  0.008  ***  0.002  0.001     0.006  0.003     0.003  0.007  **  0.003  0.010  ***  0.003 
trend*pISCED57  0.006  ***  0.002  0.001     0.006  0.006  **  0.003  0.007  **  0.003  0.002     0.003 
Age                                    
25-34                                    
35-44  -0.042  **  0.021  0.101     0.077  -0.107  ***  0.039  0.093  ***  0.035  -0.039     0.027 
45-54  -0.157  ***  0.023  -0.119     0.091  -0.239  ***  0.037  0.107  ***  0.038  -0.139  ***  0.029 
55-64  -0.455  ***  0.020  -0.281  ***  0.094  -0.585  ***  0.025  0.005     0.040  -0.387  ***  0.029 
trend*(35-44)  0.008  ***  0.002  -0.005     0.006  0.014  ***  0.003  -0.002     0.003  0.006  ***  0.002 
trend*(45-54)  0.012  ***  0.002  0.005     0.007  0.021  ***  0.003  -0.002     0.003  0.008  ***  0.002 
trend*(55-64)  0.013  ***  0.002  0.000     0.007  0.027  ***  0.003  -0.006  *  0.003  0.005  **  0.002 
Macro                                    
trend  0.000     0.002  0.000     0.008  -0.003     0.004  0.002     0.004  0.002     0.002 
cycle  0.003  ***  0.001  0.000     0.002  0.007  ***  0.001  0.000     0.001  -0.001     0.001 
Observations  818168    50464    328750    129536    309418   
Log likelihood  -432641.4    26576.7    -165905.6    -60043.2    -169651.0   
pseudo - R2  0.148      0.123      0.143      0.086      0.175     
Country dummies  yes        -        yes        yes        yes       
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Table 10. Female  activity rate: Trends and welfare regimes 
Employed  ALL  LIBERAL  CONTINENTAL  DEMOCRATIC  SOUTHERN 
  Coef.    Std. Er.  Coef.    Std. Er.  Coef.    Std. Er.  Coef.    Std. Er.  Coef.    Std. Er. 
Marital status                               
Single                               
incouple  -0.021    0.022  0.029    0.074  -0.065  *  0.035  0.033    0.034  0.008    0.033 
separated  0.055 ***  0.007  0.033  *  0.017  0.021    0.018  0.012    0.024  0.091 ***  0.009 
divorced  0.029 ***  0.005  0.039 ***  0.013  0.006    0.007  -0.020 ***  0.007  0.114 ***  0.008 
widowed  -0.032 ***  0.006  0.022  *  0.013  -0.049 ***  0.010  -0.009    0.013  -0.045 ***  0.008 
Children                               
No children                               
children  -0.032 ***  0.003  -0.019    0.012  -0.026 ***  0.006  -0.038 ***  0.006  -0.031 ***  0.004 
childd  0.046 ***  0.017  -0.001    0.068  0.085  ***  0.030  0.146  ***  0.028  0.026    0.023 
child03d  -0.120 ***  0.026  -0.313 ***  0.086  -0.186 ***  0.044  -0.381 ***  0.049  -0.038    0.034 
child36d  -0.126 ***  0.024  -0.245 ***  0.087  -0.181 ***  0.041  0.001    0.042  -0.104 ***  0.031 
child614d  -0.042 **  0.018  -0.121  *  0.068  -0.040    0.033  -0.017    0.036  -0.058 **  0.024 
trend*child  0.000    0.001  0.004    0.005  -0.002    0.002  -0.005  **  0.002  0.000    0.002 
trend*child03  -0.003    0.002  0.006    0.007  -0.002    0.004  0.015  ***  0.003  -0.002    0.003 
trend*child36  0.003    0.002  0.006    0.007  0.007  **  0.003  -0.001    0.003  0.005  *  0.003 
trend*child614  -0.002    0.001  0.000    0.005  -0.002    0.003  0.003    0.003  0.000    0.002 
Co-habiting Elderly                               
no elderly                               
old7080  0.031    0.035  -0.184    0.175  0.015    0.087  -0.100    0.111  0.028    0.039 
old80  -0.062    0.044  -0.015    0.246  -0.083    0.119  -0.062    0.191  -0.067    0.046 
trend*old7080  -0.008 ***  0.003  0.002    0.013  -0.011    0.007  -0.003    0.008  -0.006 **  0.003 
trend*old80  0.004    0.003  -0.004    0.019  0.005    0.009  -0.003    0.014  0.005    0.004 
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ISCED35  0.074 ***  0.017  0.171 ***  0.065  -0.018    0.032  0.116  ***  0.033  0.124 ***  0.023 
ISCED57  0.129 ***  0.021  0.156  **  0.073  -0.002    0.038  0.154  ***  0.036  0.223 ***  0.027 
trend*ISCED35  0.006 ***  0.001  0.001    0.006  0.012  ***  0.003  0.000    0.003  0.002    0.002 
trend*ISCED57  0.010 ***  0.002  0.007    0.006  0.019  ***  0.003  0.002    0.003  0.004  **  0.002 
pISCED03  -0.036    0.025  0.011    0.097  0.022    0.047  0.005    0.046  -0.065  *  0.035 
pISCED35  -0.043  *  0.024  0.039    0.077  0.014    0.039  -0.010    0.041  -0.093 ***  0.036 
pISCED57  -0.029    0.026  0.031    0.080  -0.024    0.042  -0.020    0.045  0.004    0.041 
trend*pISCED03  0.003  *  0.002  0.002    0.008  0.000    0.004  0.005    0.004  0.004  *  0.003 
trend*pISCED35  0.009 ***  0.002  0.004    0.006  0.004    0.003  0.008  ***  0.003  0.011 ***  0.003 
trend*pISCED57  0.006 ***  0.002  0.001    0.006  0.006  *  0.003  0.008  **  0.004  0.003    0.003 
Age                               
25-34                               
35-44  0.006    0.022  0.084    0.079  -0.061    0.039  0.125  ***  0.037  0.017    0.028 
45-54  -0.085 ***  0.023  -0.129    0.090  -0.177 ***  0.039  0.125  ***  0.041  -0.050  *  0.031 
55-64  -0.383 ***  0.021  -0.312 ***  0.089  -0.529 ***  0.025  0.010    0.043  -0.291 ***  0.029 
trend*(35-44)  0.005 ***  0.002  -0.003    0.006  0.010  ***  0.003  -0.004    0.003  0.004  *  0.002 
trend*(45-54)  0.008 ***  0.002  0.006    0.007  0.016  ***  0.003  -0.002    0.004  0.005  **  0.002 
trend*(55-64)  0.011 ***  0.002  0.004    0.007  0.025  ***  0.003  -0.006  *  0.003  0.005  *  0.003 
Macro                               
trend  0.001    0.002  0.000    0.007  -0.006    0.004  0.006    0.004  0.005  **  0.002 
cycle  0.005 ***  0.001  0.002    0.002  0.007  ***  0.001  0.001  **  0.001  0.004 ***  0.001 
Observations  818168    50464    328750    129536    309418   
Log likelihood 
-
473009.5    -27444.5    -186695.4    -67324.4   
-
185333.1   
pseudo - R2  0.128      0.117      0.122      0.084      0.132     
Country dummies  yes      -      yes      yes      yes     
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Finally,  the  trend  effect  also  differs  substantially  across  age  groups  and  across  welfare 
regimes. While in the UK, the trend effect is quite homogenous across women in different 
age  groups,  in  continental  and  southern  countries,  the  increase  in  participation  and 
employment is more evident for older age groups and this is partly explained by cohort 
effects. In fact, while there is not a substantial difference in the labour market behaviour of 
women in their mid-20s and 30s (having been born after the early 1960s and grpwn up and 
educated after the women’s movement in the 1970s), for those in their mid-30s and 40s, the 
participation  rate  has  increased  by  11  percentage  points,  and  for  those  older  than  45  by 
almost 20 percentage points. 
Regarding the trend in part-time occupations (Table 8, column 4), the most interesting result 
is the increasing involvement in part-time jobs of women with children, and this trend is 
much stronger for women with children younger than 14. This result is in line with the 
existence of a relationship between the observed increase in the labour market activity of 
women with children over the sample period and the increasing availability of part-time 
jobs. Moreover, since the trend effect on part-time mothers’ occupations is much stronger 
than the estimated trends on mother’s participation/employment, the result suggests a shift 
from full-time positions to part-time positions of women with children who were already in 
employment. 
6.  Multi-level analysis 
In this section we investigate the relevance of the labour market institutional framework and 
family  policies  in  explaining  the  trends  and  cross-country  differences  in  woman  labour 
market involvement that we pointed out in the previous section. We will refer to the variable 
of  institutional  context  and  policies  as  ‘macro’ factors.  In  the  analysis  we  will  allow  the 
interactions between micro- (individual characteristics) and macro-factors in order to detect 
any  possible  indirect  effect  of  institutions  and policies  on  employment  and participation 
through the  impact  of  micro  determinants.  The  intuition  is  straightforward:  both  macro-
factors  and  individual  characteristics  may  be  systematically  related  to  the  probability  of 
being active/employed. However, an indirect impact may be in place when macro-factors 
affect  also  the  way  micro-characteristics  impact  women’s  behaviour.  In  order  to 
simultaneously estimate the impact of micro- and macro-factors within a unified regression 
model, we use a multi-level analysis approach. This method allows us to consider a wider set 
of  determinants  of  women’s  employment  than  is  possible  with  a  standard  regression 
approach  and  to  disentangle  the  direct  and  indirect  effect  of  both  micro-  and  macro-
determinants (e.g. to estimate the simultaneous role of family care responsibilities, such as 
childcare and elderly care and family policy in determining female participation).7 
In our multi-level analysis we focus on how institutional and policy factors affect women’s 
behaviour  between  unpaid  family  responsibility  and  paid  occupation.  There  is  a  large 
consensus on the role played by institutions and policies in affecting women’s labour market 
behaviour and work attachment. The empirical analysis in the previous section shows that 
the impact of household-related responsibilities on woman labour market behaviour exhibits 
a country-specific patterns,8 and recent empirical works provide evidence that the provision 
                                                   
7 In contrast to the standard difference-in-difference approach, which uses interaction terms between 
micro-  and  macro-level  variables,  the  multi-level  method  allows  us  to  control  for  the  fact  that 
observations may be clustered by country and therefore, standard error estimates are more reliable. 
8  Our results  are  in  line  with the  findings  in several  related  papers  (see  among others Bardasi  & 
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of childcare facilities, parental leave and subsidies for day care spaces and, more generally, 
policies aimed to alleviating the financial burden of child-rearing, have a positive effect on 
female  labour  integration  by  either  increasing  work  attachment  (less  women  leaving 
occupation  after  childbirth)  or  facilitating  women’s  re-entry  into  the  labour  market  as 
children grow up (Sànchez-Mangas & Sànchez-Marcos, 2008; Lefebvre et al., 2009). Next to 
fiscal and social policies for the support of working mothers, the role played by changes in 
the institutional context is gaining increasing attention in the political debate. In the last two 
decades, the labour markets in many European countries have experienced deep changes 
towards the promotion of a so-called ‘flexicurity’ model of labour market with the aim of 
increasing competitiveness, employment creation and redistribution of work. Although the 
idea of deregulation was the common factor behind the waves of reform, the promotion of 
flexicurity was pursued through very different types of intervention on the flexibility and 
security side. In the Social Democratic countries, reforms were mainly aimed to reduce the 
protection ofn insiders by reducing the degree of employment protection on regular forms of 
employment on the one hand, and increasing income security on the other.9 
In  the  southern  countries  and  some  continental  countries,  flexibility  has  been  obtained 
through marginal reforms aimed at deregulating the use of temporary or ‘atypical’ forms of 
employment  while  leaving  largely  unchanged  the  legislation  applying  to  the  stock  of 
workers employed under permanent (open-end) contracts. In other countries, as for example 
in the Netherlands, the emphasis of the reforms was to promote flexible working time and 
part-time arrangements. Such reforms can be regarded as beneficial to women to the extent 
they facilitate labour market integration. However, this integration may occur at the risk of a 
reinforcement of the traditional separation of gender roles in the labour market and within 
the family. 
From  the  flexibility  side,  the  link  between  labour  market  deregulation  and  women’s 
participation is not clear-cut, although there are a number of empirical studies showing how 
the effects of strict employment protection legislation (EPL) are disproportionately larger for 
those individuals (such as prime-age women) who are more subject to labour market entry 
problems. As a result, in a rigid labour market, employment opportunities for prime-age 
women are significantly reduced because they are more likely than men to move between 
employment and inactivity, in particular when seeking to balance the competing demands of 
work and family life (OECD, 2004; Heckman & Pages, 2000). From the security side, whether 
the  presence  of  a  generous  unemployment  benefit  system  accompanied  by  active  (and 
activation)  policies  increases  incentives  to  work  largely  depends  on  the  eligibility 
requirements. In many countries the access to social security and to active labour policies are 
interdependent and depends on the past work history of workers (for example, contribution 
records showing recent and continuous employment). These requirements may represent a 
barrier for women who may have interrupted careers and work part-time. This implies that, 
while on the one hand, the burden of flexibility is increasingly borne by women, on the other 
women are more likely to be excluded from the access to benefits and active policies. So if 
women are in principle supposed to benefit from the combination of flexibility in the labour 
market and security in the social system, the tendency towards greter flexibility of the labour 
market  may  exert  a  negative  impact  on  the  incentives  to  participate  when  flexible 
occupations are perceived to be of lower quality and poorly securitized. 
Based  on  the  results  obtained  in  the  previous section  and  on  the  findings  of  the  related 
literature, we test two main hypotheses: 
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H₁: In countries with more progressive social policies in terms of support to families with 
young  children  (including  the  maternity,  parental  and  childcare  leave)  and  dependent 
elderly  persons,  housework  and  family-related  responsibilities  have  a  weaker  impact  on 
women’s involvement in the labour market. 
H₂: Changes in the institutional setting towards a model characterized by lower barriers to 
hiring and firing combined with a higher social protection (passive labour market policies 
and  active  labour  market  policies)  have  a  positive  impact  on  female  labour  market 
activity/employment of women and the impact is larger for women who are more involved 
in family (unpaid) occupations. 
6.1  The macro-policy and institutional indicators 
We collect several variables related to the country-specific socioeconomic context that are 
expected to affect the influence of housework and family-related responsibilities on women's 
attachment to local labour markets. We distinguish six relevant dimensions of cross-country 
heterogeneity: the extent of employment protection legislation, passive and active labour 
market policies, subsidies targeted to elderly people, subsidies targeted to families, and the 
extent of parental leave. Table 11 presents a detailed description of these dimensions, by 
focusing on their construction and their specific components. 
 In order to obtain uncorrelated synthetic indicators from the six macro-variables, we employ 
a principal-component analysis (PCA) separately on the institutions-related dimensions and 
on  the  policies-related  dimensions  to  extract  the  relevant  factors,  which  are  then  rotated 
using the varimax method. In keeping with common practice (Nardo et al., 2005, Nicoletti et 
al., 1999, Kline, 1994), two factors satisfying the following requirements have been selected: 
eigenvalues larger than 1, individual contribution to the explanation of the overall variance 
larger than 10%. Within each factor, dimensions are weighted according to the proportion of 
the cross-countries’ variance explained by the factor itself. 
The results of the two PCA procedures are presented in Table 12. Each factor explains 50% of 
the underlying variance. The first factor (henceforth called POL) is highly correlated with 
parental leave and family subsidies (with factor loadings larger than 0.8) and moderately 
correlated with the extent of subsidies to the elderly (factor loading approximately equal to 
0.26). The higher the load the more relevant in defining the factor's dimensionality. Hence 
our  first  factor  reasonably  represents  the  generosity  of  national  welfare  regimes  to 
households with dependent children. 
The second factor (henceforth called INST) is defined by active and passive labour market 
policies (with factor loadings larger than 0.9), while the extent of employment protection 
legislation exerts an inverse impact on the factor (with negative factor loading, -0.15). Hence, 
this  factor  resumes  the  degree  of  flexicurity  of  national  labour  market  institutions.  The 
similarity  between  the  standard  definition  of  flexicurity  and  our  second  factor  is 
straightforward.  Indeed,  the  European  Commission  defines  flexicurity  as  an  integrated 
strategy  to  simultaneously  enhance  flexibility  and  security  in  the  labour  market.  It  is 
traditionally implemented across three main components: 1) flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements,  which  are  negatively  correlated  with  employment  protection;  2)  effective 
active  labour  market  policies  and  3)  modern  social  security  systems  providing  adequate 
income support during employment transitions, which are positively correlated with passive 
labour-market policies. 
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Table 11. Description of macro-policy and institutional indicators 
Final 
variable 
Original 
variable  Description  Source 
Institutions 
Employment 
protection 
legislation 
Synthetic  index  of  employment  protection  which refers 
both  to  regulations  concerning  hiring  (e.g.  rules 
favouring  disadvantaged  groups,  conditions  for  using 
temporary or fixed-term contracts, training requirements) 
and  firing  (e.g.  redundancy  procedures,  mandated 
prenotification periods and severance payments, special 
requirements  for  collective  dismissals  and  short-time 
work schemes). 
OECD, 
various 
years 
Passive 
labour 
market 
policies 
Sum  of  national  expenditures  on  active  labour  market 
policies (in percentage of national GDP), including: Out-
of-work  income  maintenance  and  support,  Early 
retirement. 
OECD, 
various 
years 
Active labour 
market 
policies 
Sum  of  national  expenditures  on  active  labour  market 
policies  (in  percentage  of  national  GDP),  including: 
Training,  Job  Rotation  and  Job  Sharing,  Employment 
incentives,  Supported  employment  and  rehabilitation, 
Direct job creation, Start-up incentives.  
OECD, 
various 
years 
Policies 
Elderly 
subsidies 
Sum of national transfers to the elderly population (per 
head at constant prices (2000) and constant PPPs (2000), 
in  US  dollars),  weighted  by  the  percentage  of  old-age 
population (over 70 years old) within the country. This 
set of policies includes: Old age cash and in kind benefits, 
Residential care or Home-help services. 
OECD, 
various 
years 
Family 
Subidies 
Sum  of  national  expenditures  on  allowances  and  other 
type of monthly transfers to the households (per family at 
constant  prices  (2000)  and  constant  PPPs(2000),  in  US 
dollars). We consider a weighted sum of monthly family 
allowances  for  the  first,  second,  and  third  child  in 
national  currency,  with  weights  equal  to  the  average 
number of children a woman would have if she lived to 
the  end  of  her  childbearing  years  (conventionally 
considered  to  be  15-44  but  sometimes  15-49)  and  bore 
children at the prevailing rate for each age during that 
period. Value of tax and benefit transfers of one-earner-
two-parent two-child families are considered. The value 
was  calculated  by  subtracting  the  disposable  income 
(after  taxes  and  transfers)  of  a  one-earner-two-parent-
two-child  family  from  that  of  a  comparable  childless 
single earner.  
Gauthier 
(2011a and 
2011b) 
Paternal 
leave 
Synthetic  indicator  of  national  expenditures  on 
maternity, parental, and child care leave schemes. It is a 
weighted sum of the total number of weeks of maternity, 
parental and child-care leave, with weights equal to the 
cash benefits paid during the leave as a percent of female 
wages in manufacturing. 
Gauthier 
(2011b) 
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Table 12. Principal component analysis: Rotated factor loadings 
Variable  Factor1  Factor2  Uniqueness 
Elderly subsidies  0.2570    0.9339 
Parental leave  0.8251    0.3192 
Family subsidies  0.8399    0.2946 
Employment protection legislation    -0.1499  0.9775 
Passive labour market policies    0.9119  0.1684 
Active labour market policies    0.9215  0.1509 
6.2  The empirical specification and results 
6.2.1  The role of policy and institutions 
Our econometric specification consists of a multi-level analysis based on our (simplified) 
baseline probit model <ref>M1n</ref>. We then allow both the intercept and the impacts of 
some individual characteristics (namely having small children and co-residing with an old-
aged  dependent)  to  depend  on  two  country-specific  (but  time  variant)  macroeconomic 
factors: INST (labour-market institutional context) and POL (family-oriented policies). 
Our random coefficient model is composed of an individual first-level regression, estimated 
for each age group separately, of the following type: 
      ijt kijt k ijt jt ijt jt jt ijt x ELDERLY CHILD y      2 1 0         (5) 
and a second level set of regressions as follows: 
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We implement Generalized Linear Latent Models to estimate a two-level Random-Intercept 
Probit  model  and  a  two-level  Random-Coefficient  Probit  model,  taking  into  account  the 
nesting of individuals in their country of origin.10  
In contrast to the analysis carried out in section 5, we now focus on women in the prime age 
group  (25-54)  because  family  care  burdens,  such  as  childcare  and  elderly  care,  are  less 
relevant. The model is estimated for the whole sample (pooled model) and then for each age 
group separately. We also test whether and to what extent changes in family policies and 
labour-market institutions affect the labour-market decisions of women with different levels 
of education and estimate (5) for the three education groups (primary, secondary and tertiary 
education). 
                                                   
10  Cipollone  &  D’Ippoliti  (2011)  carried  out  a  similar  analysis  for  Italy,  exploiting  territorial 
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The  results  are  reported  in  Tables  13  and  14  for  the  activity  rate  and  participation  rate 
respectively. 
 
Table 13. Two-level probit regression: Activity rate by age groups 
Active  ALL  25-34  34-45  44-55 
  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err 
                             
ISCED35  0.131  ***  0.001  0.082  ***  0.003  0.136  ***  0.002  0.143  ***  0.002 
ISCED57  0.213  ***  0.002  0.154  ***  0.003  0.219  ***  0.003  0.235  ***  0.003 
incouple  -0.045  ***  0.002  -0.033  ***  0.003  -0.069  ***  0.003  -0.069  ***  0.004 
separated  0.059  ***  0.004  0.070  ***  0.008  0.034  ***  0.006  0.038  ***  0.007 
divorced  0.044  ***  0.003  0.071  ***  0.006  0.010  ***  0.004  0.007     0.004 
widowed  -0.056  ***  0.004  -0.038  **  0.018  -0.069  ***  0.008  -0.079  ***  0.006 
children  -0.030  ***  0.001  -0.064  ***  0.002  -0.028  ***  0.001  -0.017  ***  0.001 
child06  -0.118  ***  0.001  -0.137  ***  0.002  -0.104  ***  0.002  -0.078  ***  0.006 
old70  -0.020  ***  0.003  -0.011  *  0.007  -0.019  ***  0.005  -0.027  ***  0.005 
pISCED03  -0.038  ***  0.002  0.008  **  0.003  -0.046  ***  0.003  -0.047  ***  0.004 
pISCED35  0.004  *  0.002  0.053  ***  0.003  -0.013  ***  0.003  -0.012  ***  0.004 
pISCED57  -0.008  ***  0.002  0.042  ***  0.003  -0.028  ***  0.003  -0.025  ***  0.004 
cycle  0.001  **  0.000  -0.001     0.001  0.001     0.001  0.002  ***  0.001 
trend  -0.002    0.000  -0.009    0.000  -0.003    0.000  0.005    0.000 
democratic  0.037    0.123  0.263    0.179  0.058    0.126  -0.129    0.092 
continental  -0.041    0.115  0.251    0.169  -0.008    0.118  -0.264    0.085 
southern  -0.056    0.119  0.267    0.174  0.005    0.122  -0.303    0.086 
inst  -0.006     0.014  -0.061  *  0.037  0.008     0.015  0.024     0.015 
pol  0.003     0.024  -0.009     0.045  0.013     0.026  0.006     0.020 
inst*child06  0.015  ***  0.001  0.040  ***  0.002  0.002     0.002  0.008     0.006 
pol*child06  0.000     0.001  0.006  ***  0.002  0.003     0.002  0.008     0.006 
inst*old70  -0.020  ***  0.003  -0.013  **  0.006  -0.019  ***  0.005  -0.023  ***  0.005 
pol*old70  -0.008  **  0.003  -0.008     0.007  0.004     0.006  -0.026  ***  0.005 
age35-44  0.020  ***  0.020                      
age45-54  -0.030  ***  -0.030                      
VPC_overall  0.056        0.199        0.063        0.042       
VPC_level 2  0.426        0.675        0.439        0.439       
 
The influence of individual-level variables on female labour-market decisions is in line with 
the results in the previous section. Both the POL and INST indicators exert a significant 
impact on likelihood of the women being employed and being active, although the effect is 
mediated by the type of unpaid work involved (presence of child or/and elderly person) and 
differs substantially across age groups. Regarding the role of family policies, the availability 
of  child  subsidies  and  child-friendly  policies  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  activity  rate, 
although the effect appears to be significant only for relatively young women (25-34) at the 
early  stage  of  their  work  life.  Measures  to  help  women  combine  caring  responsibilities 
appear also to have a positive and significant effect on the employment opportunities of 
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life, when the presence of family subsidies reduces the incentives to remain in the labour 
force for those women living with an elderly person. 
More  flexibility  combined  with  more  security  (represented  by  INST  indicator  in  the 
regression) is employment-enhancing for young women with small children, but the effect 
disappears for women in the older age groups. Quite surprisingly, higher labour flexibility is 
detrimental  for  the  labour  market  involvement  of  women  co-habitating  with  an  elderly 
person.  This  result  may  be  related  to  the  fact  that  just  a  few  countries  in  Europe  have 
combined the two dimensions of flexibility and security,11 and, in most cases, deregulation is 
moving  forward  without  sufficient  social  compensation.  In  this  respect,  the  growing 
availability of flexible low-paid jobs, which very often represent a forced alternative rather 
than  an  option  to  more  stable  forms  of  employment,  make  unpaid  elderly  caring  more 
attractive than paid occupations, especially in countries where family-caring activities are 
supported  by  monetary  allowances  that  can  be  freely  used  to  complement  the  family 
budget.12 
Tables 15 and 16 present the impact of the macro-factors estimated for the three education 
groups separately. The results confirm substantially those reported in s 13 and 14. 
Interestingly,  the  impact  of  family-care  burdens  on  women  participation/employment 
declines  with  the  level  of  education.  Indeed,  highly  educated  women  show  a  higher 
propensity to be involved in paid work even in presence of family care responsibilities. 
Family policies provide a set of incentives/opportunities to remain in the labour market for 
medium- and highly educated women with children, but the effect is negative for low-skilled 
women,  whose  employment  opportunities  are  limited  both  in  terms  of  quality  of  jobs 
available and wages. Similarly, larger family subsidies have a negative impact on the labour-
market participation of low-educated women who are involved in elderly care. The effect 
turns to be positive for medium-educated women and not significant for highly educated 
women. These results show how women's choices between paid work and unpaid care and 
the  effects  of  policies  crucially  depend  on  the outside  family  options  and  their  potential 
labour-market outcome. In general, cash benefits increase household income and raise the 
reservation  wage  at  which  women  are  available  for  work.  Therefore,  more  generous 
supports for child- and elderly-related costs discourage labour market participation those in 
charge of family care, typically women, when the labour market opportunities are poor. 
Consistent with the results found in the previous set of estimations, the INST indicator is 
positively related to the likelihood of participating and being employed regardless of the 
level of education of the mother, implying that a larger availability of flexicure employment 
systems increases the likelihood of entry (or re-entry) into the labour market for women with 
young  children.  However,  the  negative  effect  of  elderly  care  on  participation  and 
employment  is  larger  in  a  more  deregulated  labour  market.  Such  effect  holds  for  low-
medium educated women (whose work propensity is lower and work opportunities are in 
general poorer) but not for highly educated women whose labour market opportunities are 
less vulnerable to institutional changes. 
   
                                                   
11 Combining the two axes of flexibility and security, Tangian (2007) concludes that only Denmark and 
the Netherlands are developing both dimensions. 
12 See Simonazzi (2009) for a detailed analysis of the recent dynamics of the care sector in the EU 
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Table 15. Two-level probit regression: Activity rate by education groups 
Active  ISCED_03  ISCED_35  ISCED_57 
variable  Coef    Std. Err  Coef    Std. Err  Coef    Std. Err 
                      
incouple  -0.08  ***  0.004  -0.05  ***  0.003  -0.04  ***  0.002 
separated  0.056  ***  0.007  0.061  ***  0.007  0.019  ***  0.007 
divorced  0.034  ***  0.005  0.045  ***  0.004  0.013  ***  0.004 
widowed  -0.08  ***  0.007  -0.05  ***  0.007  -0.03  ***  0.008 
children  -0.03  ***  0.001  -0.03  ***  0.001  -0.01  ***  0.001 
child06  -0.13  ***  0.003  -0.12  ***  0.002  -0.11  ***  0.002 
old70  -0.04  ***  0.006  -0.02  ***  0.006  -0.02  ***  0.006 
pISCED03  -0.05  ***  0.004  -0.01  **  0.003  0.001     0.004 
pISCED35  -0.02  ***  0.004  0.01  ***  0.003  0.026  ***  0.003 
pISCED57  -0.03  ***  0.006  -0.02  ***  0.003  0.014  ***  0.003 
age35-44  -0.03  ***  0.003  0.031  ***  0.002  0.041  ***  0.002 
age45-54  -0.11  ***  0.003  -0.01  ***  0.003  0.024  ***  0.002 
inst  0.004     0.028  -0.02     0.013  -0.05  ***  0.014 
pol  -0.02     0.041  -0     0.024  -0.01     0.020 
cycle  0.002  **  0.001  0.002  ***  0.001  0.001  **  0.001 
democratic  0.091    0.142  0.163    0.142  0.194    0.117 
continental  -0.08    0.132  0.054    0.135  0.16    0.111 
southern  -0.03    0.136  0.024    0.138  0.132    0.114 
trend  -0    0.001  -0    0.000  -0    0.000 
inst*child06  0.012  ***  0.003  0.014  ***  0.002  0.025  ***  0.002 
pol*child06  0.001     0.002  0.004  **  0.002  0.011  ***  0.002 
inst*old70  -0.04  ***  0.006  -0.02  ***  0.006  -0     0.006 
pol*old70  -0.02  ***  0.006  -0     0.006  0.002     0.006 
VPC_overall  0.121        0.048        0.058       
VPC_level 2  0.572        0.419        0.453       
 
The variance partition coefficient (VPC) of the pooled model is approximately equal to 0.06, 
which  indicates  that  6%  of  the  variance  in  employment  and  participation  rates  can  be 
attributed  to  differences  between  countries.  This  coefficient  globally  increases  when  the 
models are separately estimated by age group and educational level. In particular, it seems 
that  macroeconomic  heterogeneities  are  particularly  relevant  in  explaining  cross-country 
differences in employment and participation rates of younger and less skilled women (VPC 
increases up to 20% and 11% respectively), while individual heterogeneity accounts for more 
than 95% of those differences for women between 45 and 55 years of age. Our macro-factors 
are able to explain almost 50% of the overall cross-country variance, as shown by the level-2 
variance partition coefficients of our employment and participation rate estimates. 
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Table 16. Two-level probit regression: Employment rate by education groups 
Active  ISCED_03    ISCED_35    ISCED_57   
variable  Coef    Std. Err  Coef    Std. Err  Coef    Std. Err 
                   
incouple  -0.043 ***  0.004  -0.035 ***  0.003  -0.032 ***  0.003 
separated  0.048 ***  0.008  0.052 ***  0.008  0.032 ***  0.008 
divorced  0.023 ***  0.006  0.030 ***  0.004  0.009 **  0.004 
widowed  -0.027 ***  0.007  -0.030 ***  0.008  -0.015 *  0.009 
children  -0.031 ***  0.001  -0.028 ***  0.001  -0.011 ***  0.001 
child06  -0.139 ***  0.003  -0.129 ***  0.003  -0.108 ***  0.002 
old70  -0.022 ***  0.007  -0.021 ***  0.006  -0.037 ***  0.006 
pISCED03  -0.013 ***  0.004  0.023 ***  0.004  0.022 ***  0.004 
pISCED35  0.027 ***  0.005  0.049 ***  0.003  0.055 ***  0.003 
pISCED57  0.022 ***  0.006  0.027 ***  0.004  0.048 ***  0.003 
age35-44  0.003    0.003  0.046 ***  0.003  0.062 ***  0.002 
age45-54  -0.056 ***  0.003  0.015 ***  0.003  0.051 ***  0.003 
inst  -0.018    0.028  -0.044 **  0.018  -0.063 ***  0.015 
pol  -0.037    0.041  -0.005    0.030  -0.002    0.027 
cycle  0.003 ***  0.001  0.002 ***  0.001  0.001 **  0.001 
democratic  0.078    0.139  0.128    0.172  0.236    0.134 
continental  -0.121    0.129  0.004    0.165  0.141    0.128 
southern  -0.102    0.133  -0.076    0.169  0.095    0.132 
trend  0.000    0.001  -0.001    0.000  -0.003    0.000 
inst*child06  -0.009 **  0.004  0.001    0.003  0.017 ***  0.003 
pol*child06  0.002    0.003  0.007 ***  0.002  0.011 ***  0.002 
inst*old70  -0.030 ***  0.006  -0.009    0.007  0.002    0.007 
pol*old70  -0.011 *  0.006  0.012 *  0.007  0.007    0.006 
VPC_overall  0.114      0.067      0.073     
VPC_level 2  0.593      0.489      0.525     
6.2.2  The role of flexicurity 
In  the  last  set  of  regressions,  we  focus  more  specifically  on  the  impact  of  flexicurity  on 
women labour market involvement by disentangling the impact of the two components of 
the  indicator  INST:  flexibility  (FLEX)  and  security  (SEC)  and  their  interaction 
(FLEXICURITY). 
The results for the activity rate and participation rate are reported in Table 17. 
The table shows that a higher degree of labour flexibility has a positive effect on employment 
and  activity  rates  only  if  it  is  accompanied  by  policies  aimed  at  guaranteeing  access  to 
employment security. At the same time, a larger degree of security is beneficial for women 
involvement  only  in  sufficiently  flexible  labour  markets  that  provide  easier  access  to 
employment. Such effects are stronger for women who are more involved in family duties 
such as childcare and elderly care. These results suggest that combining a high degree of 
labour-market flexibility with a high level of social protection leads to significant gains in 
terms  of  women  labour-market  participation,  while  omitting  one  of  these  two  factor  can 
produce a sub-optimal (or even negative) outcome in terms of employment performance. 
The marginal effect of flexibility on the employment (activity) rate turns out to be positive in 
correspondence to a value of the security indicator above 1.66 (1.57). On the other hand, the WOMEN’S LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE: TRENDS AND SHAPING FACTORS | 43 
 
marginal effect of security on the employment (activity) rate turns out to be positive for a 
value of the flexibility indicator above 1.77 (1.75). 
Table 17. Two-level probit regression: The impact of flexibility and security - whole sample 
   Employment     Activity 
  Coef    Std. Err    Coef.    Std. Err 
                 
flex  -0.274  **  0.129    -0.157  *  0.091 
security  -0.287  **  0.113    -0.175  **  0.089 
flexicurity=flex x security  0.164  ***  0.057    0.099  **  0.039 
flex_child-0-6  -0.069  ***  0.003    -0.067  ***  0.003 
security_child-0-6  -0.038  ***  0.004    -0.014  ***  0.004 
flexicurity_child0-6  0.026  ***  0.002    0.020  ***  0.002 
fex_old_70  -0.019  ***  0.006    -0.021  ***  0.005 
security_old_70  -0.031  ***  0.008    -0.036  ***  0.008 
flexicurity_old-70  0.008     0.005    0.007     0.005 
VPC_overall  0.041           0.224       
VPC_level 2  0.042           0.264       
 
In Figure 10 we can observe that in the period 2004-09, the countries for which both the 
flexibility and security indicators are above the estimated thresholds are the Nordic countries 
(although only marginally for Sweden), the Netherlands and at the margin Belgium, Austria, 
Germany and Ireland. After the institutional reforms implemented in the late 1990s and early 
2000s to promote a more flexible labour market, Italy still appears deficient on the security 
side. The opposite holds for France and Spain, which are still characterized by a rigid labour 
market. Greece and Portugal remain well below the thresholds. 
Figure 10. The two dimensions of flexicurity - Flexibility vs. security 
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Finally, in Tables 18 and 19 we run the same regressions for women in different age groups 
and with different levels of education respectively. The impacts of flexibility, security and 
their interactions are significant and qualitatively the same across age groups, although the 
estimated coefficients are stronger for women at the early stages of their working careers. 
The disincentive effect of flexibility on labour supply appears significantly stronger among 
low-skilled  women;  this  effect  is  statistically  significant  when  women  are  involved  in 
childcare activity despite their level of education. 
 
Table 18. Two-level probit regression: The impact of flexibility and security - age groups 
   Employment    
   25-34        35-44        45-54          
  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err   
                        
Flex  -0.195     0.136  -0.313  **  0.137  -0.106     0.074   
security  -0.218  *  0.121  -0.306  **  0.126  -0.129  ***  0.052   
flexicurity=flex x security  0.129  **  0.055  0.171  ***  0.069  0.076  ***  0.026   
flex_child-0-6  -0.081  ***  0.004  -0.067  ***  0.005  -0.048  ***  0.012   
security_child-0-6  -0.046  ***  0.006  -0.067  ***  0.007  -0.037  *  0.020   
flexicurity_child0-6  0.039  ***  0.003  0.036  ***  0.004  0.021  **  0.010   
flex_old_70  -0.009     0.012  -0.043  ***  0.009  -0.014     0.009   
security_old_70  -0.022     0.017  -0.040  ***  0.014  -0.026  **  0.013   
flexicurity_old-70  0.013     0.011  0.019  **  0.008  -0.003     0.008   
VPC_overall  0.287        0.041        0.259          
VPC_level 2  0.328        0.042        0.564          
  Activity   
  
25-34        35-44        45-54       
  
  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err   
                        
flex  -0.197     0.139  -0.131     0.094  -0.057    0.072   
security  -0.168  *  0.098  -0.132     0.097  -0.044    0.070   
flexicurity=flex x security  0.095  *  0.050  0.084  *  0.044  0.029    0.033   
flex_child-0-6  -0.056  ***  0.004  -0.069  ***  0.004  -0.044    0.011   
security_child-0-6  0.021  ***  0.006  -0.067  ***  0.007  -0.022    0.019   
flexicurity_child0-6  0.019  ***  0.003  0.038  ***  0.003  0.016    0.009   
flex_old_70  -0.027  **  0.011  -0.033  ***  0.009  -0.010    0.008   
security_old_70  -0.042  ***  0.016  -0.036  ***  0.013  -0.017    0.012   
flexicurity_old-70  0.022  **  0.010  0.010     0.008  -0.007    0.007   
VPC_overall  0.257        0.308        0.333          
VPC_level 2  0.287        0.385        0.589          
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Table 19. Two-level probit regression: The impact of flexibility and security - education levels 
   Employment 
  
ISCED 
0-2 
     
ISCED 
3-5 
     
ISCED 
5-7 
     
  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err 
                      
flex  -0.393  **  0.201  -0.024     0.068  -0.051     0.063 
security  -0.379  ***  0.115  -0.041     0.067  -0.072     0.064 
flexicurity=flex x security  0.241  ***  0.056  0.011     0.032  0.015     0.029 
flex_child-0-6  -0.066  ***  0.005  -0.090  ***  0.005  -0.056  ***  0.005 
security_child-0-6  -0.038  ***  0.008  -0.073  ***  0.007  -0.004     0.007 
flexicurity_child0-6  0.024  ***  0.005  0.045  ***  0.004  0.012  ***  0.004 
flex_old_70  -0.008     0.009  -0.023  **  0.011  -0.008     0.011 
security_old_70  -0.010     0.013  -0.056  ***  0.016  -0.016     0.016 
flexicurity_old-70  -0.012     0.008  0.025  ***  0.009  0.010     0.010 
VPC_overall  0.053        0.201        0.209       
VPC_level 2  0.054        0.319        0.306       
  Activity 
  
ISCED 
0-2 
     
ISCED 
3-5 
     
ISCED 
5-7 
     
  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err  Coef   
Std. 
Err 
                      
flex  -0.136     0.149  -0.002     0.064  -0.002     0.046 
security  -0.242  *  0.149  0.022     0.063  0.022     0.049 
flexicurity=flex x security  0.133  ***  0.054  -0.026     0.032  -0.026     0.025 
flex_child-0-6  -0.067  ***  0.005  -0.084  ***  0.005  -0.084  ***  0.004 
security_child-0-6  -0.010     0.008  -0.048  ***  0.006  -0.048  ***  0.006 
flexicurity_child0-6  0.019  ***  0.004  0.038  ***  0.003  0.038  ***  0.003 
flex_old_70  -0.002     0.009  -0.048  ***  0.010  -0.048  ***  0.009 
security_old_70  -0.013     0.013  -0.078  ***  0.014  -0.078  ***  0.014 
flexicurity_old-70  -0.017  **  0.008  0.035  ***  0.008  0.035  ***  0.009 
VPC_overall  0.365        0.211        0.211       
VPC_level 2  0.418        0.322        0.323       
7.  Conclusions 
Female participation and employment rates in the EU have increased substantially over the 
last two decades, yielding to a gradual decline in the employment gender gap. In many 
countries  the  observed  patterns  in  both  participation  and  employment  have  occurred  in 
conjunction with a progressive deregulation of the labour market and a growing attention to 
policy interventions aimed at increasing women’s labour market participation. 
Our analysis provides evidence on trends of women labour market involvement (both in 
quantitative  and  qualitative  terms)  by  looking  at  the  evolution  of  women  labour  market 
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Once  individual  characteristics  and  country-specific  factors  have  been  controlled  for,  we 
document  an  increase  in  female  labour  force  participation  with  respect  to  men  with 
comparable qualifications across welfare regimes. We also find that an increase in women 
labour market participation (with respect to men) is associated with larger shares of women 
in  temporary  and  part-time  jobs  in  southern  European  countries.  In  contrast,  in  Nordic 
countries  the  increase  in  women  labour  participation  is  associated  with  larger  shares  of 
women in full-time employment. These results are mainly driven by women in prime-age, 
i.e. 25-54 years of age, and with a low level of education. This suggests that on the one hand 
the increasing availability of ‘atypical’ jobs and more flexible forms of employment may have 
helped women to better integrate in the labour market and narrow the employment gap with 
men.  On  the  other,  this  integration  process  has  mainly  occurred  at  the  expense  of  an 
increasing gender gap in terms of quality of occupation, to the extent that differences across 
genders in the ‘quality’ of occupation are not fully explained by different preferences or 
productivity of men and women. This seems to be particularly true in those countries, such 
as the southern countries, where family-oriented policies are still less developed and, at the 
same  time,  the  extended  family  (traditionally  a  source  of  support)  has  been  gradually 
evolving into the smaller nuclear family. 
Our regression analysis reveals that individual characteristics still play an important role in 
shaping  women  labour  market  behaviour,  although  the  impact  is  mediated  by  the 
institutional and political context in which women function. In particular, household-care 
burdens appear as the key factors influencing participation rate. In this respect, along with 
the presence of children especially of pre-school age, the rapid ageing of the population has 
motivated an increasing interest towards the effects of elderly care on female labour supply. 
Our results show that, between 1994 and 2009, participation and employment increased for 
women with small children. However, such an increase has not been uniform across welfare 
regimes.  Indeed,  the  negative  impact  of  young  children  on  women  labour  market 
involvement  declined  significantly  in  Social  Democratic  countries  and  to  a  less  extent  in 
continental and southern countries, while no trend has been detected for the UK. At the same 
time,  the  negative  impact  of  informal  elderly  care  on  employment  and  participation  has 
increased over time. Indeed, according to our results, the presence of a co-habiting elderly 
person has a positive (and significant) impact on female labour market involvement at the 
beginning  of  a  sample  period  and  then  turns  negative.  This  seems  to  be  related  to  the 
changing  role  of  elderly  relatives  within  the  family,  from  providers  of  unpaid  help  in 
household and childcare activities within the extended family to recipients of informal long-
term care in the nuclear family. 
These trends are related to the institutional and policy changes that have been introduced in 
almost all European countries since the end of the 1990s. Such changes had an important 
impact on the labour market ‘opportunities’ of women by affecting the quality of potential 
jobs  available,  the  chance  to  (re-)enter  the  labour  market  and  the  opportunity  costs  of 
employment (vs. non-employment). 
A central result of our multi-level analysis is that, contrary to conventional assumptions, 
women’s labour supply response to childcare and elderly care may be different, because 
women react differently to policy incentives and institutional roles according to the type of 
household care burden. One possible reason for the observed differences is the fact that an 
elderly  person  often  contributes  with  his  or  her  pension  to  the  household  income,  thus 
increasing the reservation wage at which women are available to work. This implies that the 
discouraging impact of care for the elderly is different from that of children care and it is 
stronger for low-skilled women (whose labour market opportunities are poor) and in the 
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The results of the multi-level estimation go to this direction. The observed change in the 
attitude towards work of on the part women with children has been encouraged by the 
expansion of flexible forms of employment (fixed-term contracts and part-time jobs), which 
have progressively eased the labour market access and the reconciliation of family/child 
responsibilities with paid work. This positive effect is stronger for women in the early stage 
of  their  work  life  regardless  of  their  level  of  education.  Generous  child  benefits  and 
maternity/paternity leave have a positive impact on labour market attachment of young 
women, and the effect is stronger for medium/highly educated groups. 
Family subsidies work in the opposite direction for low-skilled women with elderly care 
responsibilities, since monetary subsidies have a stronger income effect on those individuals 
with  a  lower  market  wage.  Interestingly,  the  deregulation  of  the  labour  market  has  a 
negative impact on the participation rate of women co-habiting with an elderly relative. Such 
effect holds for low-medium educated women (whose work propensity is lower and work 
opportunities are poorer in general) but not for well educated women whose labour market 
opportunities  (and  the  quality  of  job  opportunities)  are  less  susceptible  to  institutional 
changes. 
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Appendix 1. The Vigdor Index 
A1.1 Methodological framework 
Let us define D to be a binary variable taking the value 0 if the individual is in group 0, 1 if 
he/she is in group 1. 
We  are  interested  in  assessing  differences  between  group  0  and  group  1  using  a  one-
dimensional measure of how different are the distributions of some characteristics x between 
group 0 and 1. 
Let  us  denote  by    x f0   the  density  function  of  x  among group  0  individuals  (reference 
group),    x f1  the density function of x among group 1 individuals. 
Vigdor (2008) estimates a model for 
   
     
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| 1         (A1.1) 
where p is the proportion of group 1 individuals in the population and    x f  is the density 
function of x in the population. A generalization of the Vigdor index which is between zero 
and one and is composition invariant (i.e. it does not depend on p) is: 
   
          
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Such an analysis is based on the ratio        x f x f x g 1 0 /   which will be equal to 1 if group 0 
and 1 have the same distribution of x. This implies that any difference in the observed x will 
result in a discrepancy between group 0 and 1 in the synthetic index. 
 An important empirical issue is that there might be some characteristics – let us denote these 
by  z  –  whose  differences  between  group  0  and  1  are  not  appropriate  to  take  into 
consideration in infering a behavioural difference between group 0 and 1. For example, we 
might  not  want  to  label  differences  in  the  age  structures  between  the  two  groups  as 
differences  in  labour  market  behaviour  between  the  two  groups.  The  unconditional 
distribution  of  x  (as  in  (A1.1))  will  be  different  if  individuals  in  group  0  and  1  have  a 
different distribution of z. An analysis based on (A1.1) would be misleading. For example, if 
group 0 and group 1 are women and men, we do not want to capture differences in labour 
market performance between women and men due to different gender population structure. 
Gender  demographic  trends  are  correlated  to  differences  in  employment,  labour  market 
participation or job types, but they are not a matter of research themselves. Therefore, we 
need to work with the distribution of x given z. 
Denote by    z x f | 0  the density function of x given z among group 0 individuals,    z x f | 1  
the  density  function  of  x  given  z  among  group  1  individuals.  Define  the  marginal 
distributions of z among group 0 and 1,    z h0  and    z h1  respectively. We are thus interested 
in the ratio between density functions: 
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|                 (A1.2) 52 | CIPOLLONE, PATACCHINI & VALLANTI 
 
A  generalization  of  the  Vigdor  index  that  allows  for  the  presence  of  z  variables,  while 
remaining composition invariant, is:13 
       
 dxdz z h z x f
z x g
I 1 1 |
| 1
1
2               (A1.3)   
Empirically, one has to get an estimate of    z x g | . One way to proceed is as follows. 
Estimate a probit model for being an individual of group 1 on x and z: 
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We can write: 
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Substituting into (A1.2) we have that: 
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Estimate a probit model for being an individual of group 1 conditional on z alone: 
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We can write: 
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Substituting into (A1.5) we have that: 
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In short, the relative densities of x conditional on z can be estimated from the predicted 
probabilities of two probits for being an individual in group 1, one conditional on x and z 
and the other conditional on z alone. 
Having    z x g |   on  hand,  the  average  value  of  the  transformation      z x g | 1 / 1    across 
group 1 individuals, will then give the synthetic index (A1.3).14 
                                                   
13 The Vigdor index (Vigdor, 2008) is derived for a value of p=0.5 and does not explicitly deal with 
differences between x and z variables. 
14 Such an analysis has been used in the book Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, edited by 
Yann  Algan,  Alberto  Bisin,  Alan  Manning  and  Thierry  Verdier,  Oxford:  Oxford University  Press, 
forthcoming  (http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199660094.do#.UGG03c2RY8Z)  to  study 
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A1.2  Adaptation to our setting 
 In our analysis we define D as a dummy taking 1 if the individual is female (disadvantaged 
group) and 0 otherwise. We consider four x variables,  4 ,..., 1 ,  k xk : 
 -  1 x : dummy taking value 1 if the individual is inactive, and 0 if active (participation rate); 
 -  2 x : dummy taking value 1 if the active individual is employed, and 0 if unemployed 
(unemployment rate); 
 -  3 x : dummy taking value 1 if the employed individual is temporary, and 0 if permanent; 
and 
 -  4 x : dummy taking value 1 if the employed individual is part-time, and 0 if full-time. 
We  use  as  control  variables  z  the  individual  education  level,  marital  status,  partner 
education, number of children and age. 
We thus derive four synthetic indicators (activity index, employment index, type of contract 
index 1 and type of contract index 2, respectively) for each European country and each year 
between 1994-2000 (ECHP) and  between 2004-09 (EU-SILC) and we perform T-test statistics 
to assess significant difference between the begin and the end of the observed time window. 
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Appendix 2. Synthetic indicator: Complete list of results 
Table A1. Activity gap by country and year 
  Year 
Country  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  P-VALUE 
AT    0.8742  0.9031  0.9068  0.8954  0.9139  0.9192  0.9161  0.9126  0.9176  0.9232  0.9260  0.9443  0.0000 
BE  0.9427  0.9394  0.9384  0.9348  0.9550  0.9547  0.9555  0.9587  0.9676  0.9685  0.9749  0.9763  0.9754  0.0000 
DE  0.9622  0.9622  0.9622  0.9622  0.9622  0.9622  0.9622    0.9622  0.9622  0.9622  0.9622  0.9622  0.5761 
DK  0.9858  0.9844  0.9783  0.9829  0.9859  0.9897  0.9899  0.9834  0.9931  0.9905  0.9936  0.9907  0.9984  0.0000 
ES  0.7959  0.7916  0.7958  0.8054  0.8152  0.8328  0.8408  0.8961  0.9021  0.9147  0.9285  0.9391  0.9454  0.0000 
FI      0.9975  0.9972  0.9943  0.9933  0.9954  0.9872  0.9889  0.9884  0.9869  0.9856  0.9811  0.0000 
FR  0.9521  0.9293  0.9234  0.9280  0.9349  0.9437  0.9444  0.9797  0.9824  0.9874  0.9888    0.9843  0.0000 
GR  0.8104  0.8167  0.8089  0.8197  0.8266  0.8114  0.8405  0.8937  0.9000  0.9005  0.9073  0.9148  0.9201  0.0000 
IE  0.7166  0.7383  0.7744  0.7903  0.8129  0.8430  0.8632  0.9094  0.9020  0.8871  0.9106  0.9048  0.9094  0.0000 
IT  0.8110  0.8287  0.8269  0.8398  0.8477  0.8604  0.8499  0.9275  0.9191  0.9173  0.9213  0.9203  0.9287  0.0000 
LU    0.7657  0.7573  0.7883  0.7929  0.7949  0.8084  0.8741  0.8829  0.8844  0.9146  0.9166  0.9128  0.0000 
NL  0.9311  0.9608  0.9567  0.9623  0.9708  0.9706  0.9676    0.8974  0.9523  0.9596  0.9672  0.9747  0.0000 
PT  0.8719  0.8894  0.9058  0.9132  0.9151  0.9278  0.9279  0.9537  0.9614  0.9649  0.9727  0.9638  0.9657  0.0000 
SE        0.9962  0.9962  0.9962  0.9962  0.9962  0.9962  0.9962  0.9962  0.9962  0.9962  0.6140 
UK  0.9521  0.9578  0.9572  0.9533  0.9583  0.9622  0.9621    0.9649  0.9545  0.9738  0.9686  0.9693  0.0008 
Note: Missing values denote missing information in the original sample. P-values contain significance values of mean-comparison tests  
between the synthetic indicators at the beginning and at the end of the time window. 
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Table A2. Employment gap by country and year 
  Year 
Country  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  P-VALUE 
AT    1.0000  0.9999  1.0000  0.9987  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.9991  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.2003 
BE  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.9887  0.1005 
DE  0.9986  0.9978  0.9987  0.9999  0.9993  0.9989  0.9997    0.9978  1.0000  0.9993  0.9999  1.0000  0.0001 
DK  0.9975  0.9872  0.9946  0.9925  0.9931  0.9961  0.9920  0.9999  0.9994  0.9982  0.9976  0.9992  1.0000  0.0129 
ES  0.9951  0.9939  0.9943  0.9948  0.9945  0.9912  0.9868  0.9833  0.9844  0.9852  0.9848  0.9949  0.9987  0.0121 
FI      1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.2797 
FR  0.9964  0.9926  0.9949  0.9931  0.9902  0.9895  0.9904  0.9997  0.9982  0.9959  0.9958    0.9999  0.0008 
GR  0.9788  0.9809  0.9830  0.9851  0.9865  0.9870  0.9922  0.9870  0.9866  0.9845  0.9872  0.9920  0.9932  0.0005 
IE  0.9686  0.9722  0.9771  0.9688  0.9780  0.9901  0.9996  0.9924  0.9904  0.9925  0.9945  0.9860  0.9825  0.0011 
IT  0.9948  0.9961  0.9953  0.9926  0.9948  0.9935  0.9954  0.9933  0.9921  0.9914  0.9920  0.9912  0.9920  0.0869 
LU    1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.3528 
NL  0.9765  0.9637  0.9718  0.9702  0.9735  0.9704  0.9801    0.9997  0.9997  1.0000  1.0000  0.9998  0.0000 
PT  0.9944  0.9983  0.9939  0.9987  0.9968  0.9981  0.9988  0.9994  0.9954  0.9984  0.9992  0.9969  0.9997  0.0226 
SE        1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.9503 
UK  0.9865  0.9966  0.9926  0.9965  0.9955  0.9956  0.9996    0.9989  0.9954  0.9967  0.9967  0.9959  0.0000 
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Table A3. Part-time employment gap by country and year 
  Year 
Country  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  P-VALUE 
AT     0.8877  0.8875  0.8749  0.8645  0.8493  0.8383  0.8190  0.7773  0.8259  0.7954  0.8041  0.8027  0.0000 
BE    0.8650  0.8763  0.8797  0.8704  0.8593  0.8785  0.8197  0.8328  0.8281  0.8217  0.8249  0.8270  0.0197 
DE    0.9128  0.8997  0.8938  0.9007  0.9153  0.8998    0.7167  0.7605  0.7412  0.7585  0.7726  0.0000 
DK    0.9302  0.9302  0.9302  0.9302  0.9302  0.9302  0.9302  0.9302  0.9302  0.9302  0.9302  0.9302  0.3640 
ES    0.9402  0.9402  0.9402  0.9402  0.9402  0.9402  0.9402  0.9402  0.9402  0.9402  0.9402  0.9402  0.1604 
FI      0.9891  0.9842  0.9842  0.9902  0.9881  0.9749  0.9737  0.9694  0.9737  0.9715  0.9750  0.0004 
FR    0.9307  0.9265  0.9234  0.9421  0.9412  0.9450  0.8870  0.8850  0.8764  0.8829    0.8862  0.0000 
GR    0.9644  0.9544  0.9497  0.9495  0.9483  0.9421  0.9467  0.9304  0.9439  0.9441  0.9423  0.9477  0.0353 
IE    0.8635  0.8635  0.8635  0.8635  0.8635  0.8635  0.8635  0.8635  0.8635  0.8635  0.8635  0.8635  0.2439 
IT    0.9383  0.9379  0.9372  0.9325  0.9295  0.9303  0.9089  0.8939  0.9011  0.8953  0.8923  0.9038  0.0000 
LU      0.9160  0.8690  0.9036  0.9077  0.9025  0.8747  0.8628  0.8467  0.8332  0.8449  0.8336  0.0001 
NL    0.6658  0.6556  0.6811  0.6707  0.6614  0.6733    0.6299  0.6175  0.6240  0.6280  0.6292  0.0088 
PT    0.9596  0.9598  0.9543  0.9591  0.9506  0.9654  0.9714  0.9771  0.9799  0.9721  0.9718  0.9736  0.0468 
SE        0.9558  0.9413  0.9708  0.9647  0.8911  0.8770  0.8939  0.8871  0.8714  0.8638  0.0000 
UK    0.8210  0.8300  0.8346  0.8405  0.8429  0.8310    0.8485  0.8317  0.8431    0.8531  0.0138 
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Table A4. Temporary employment gap by country and year 
  Year 
Country  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  P-VALUE 
AT    1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.9626  0.9698  0.9708  0.9687  0.9710  0.9786  0.0000 
BE    1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.9590  0.9531  0.9523  0.9634  0.9508  0.9548  0.0000 
DE    1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000    0.9762  0.9760  0.9554  0.9853  0.9884  0.0000 
DK    0.9812  0.9951  0.9856  0.9834  0.9716  0.9821  0.9357  0.9385  0.9290  0.9479  0.8848  0.8952  0.0000 
ES    1.0000  0.9937  1.0000  0.9902  0.9957  0.9882  0.9696  0.9621  0.9594  0.9593  0.9625  0.9669  0.0000 
FI      0.9690  0.9547  0.9627  0.9610  0.9572  0.8910  0.8878  0.8945  0.8919  0.8989  0.9168  0.0000 
FR    0.9658  0.9528  0.9655  0.9561  0.9558  0.9561  0.9616  0.9561  0.9539  0.9449    0.9521  0.0000 
GR    0.9865  0.9684  0.9852  0.9424  0.9435  0.9564  0.9393  0.9422  0.9452  0.9533  0.9464  0.9463  0.0000 
IE    0.9407  0.9418  0.9479  0.9509  0.9575  0.9487  0.9238  0.9179  0.9210  0.8955  0.9104  0.9049  0.0000 
IT    0.9430  0.9444  0.9363  0.9373  0.9433  0.9305  0.9256  0.9247  0.9226  0.9231  0.9298  0.9302  0.0000 
LU      0.9794  1.0000  0.9874  0.9821  0.9783  0.9747  0.9830  0.9832  1.0000  0.9956  0.9995  0.0000 
NL    1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000    0.9286  0.9201  0.9082  0.8950  0.9038  0.0000 
PT    1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.9696  0.9668  0.9744  0.9711  0.9717  0.9811  0.0000 
SE        0.9576  0.9668  0.9778  0.9712  0.9269  0.9003  0.9395  0.9357  0.9416  0.9483  0.0027 
UK    0.9677  0.9677  0.9677  0.9677  0.9677  0.9677    0.9677  0.9677  0.9677    0.9677  0.1160 58 | CIPOLLONE, PATACCHINI & VALLANTI 
 
Appendix 3. Multi-level Analysis 
The methodological framework 
A3.1 The random intercept model 
Let 
*
ij y   be  the  latent  variable  for  individual  i  in  region  j.  We  observe  the  dichotomous 
response  variable  ij y ,  which  takes  value  1  if  the  individual  individual  i  in  country  j  is 
employed (or active) and 0 otherwise. Let  ij x  be a r×1 vector of individual and household 
characteristics and  ij z  be a t×1 vector of characteristics of the country of residence.  j u0  is the 
random effect, or level-2 residual for region j, with  j u0    
2
0 , 0 u N  ;  ij     
2 , 0   N  is the 
level-1 residual.  j u0  and  ij   are independent. 
The random intercept model is composed of a level-1 model (the individual level): 
ij ij j j ij y      x α 0                   (A3.1) 
and a level-2 model (the country-level): 
α α
βz

  
j
j j j u0 0 0  
                 (A3.2) 
where  0   is a constant and β is a t×1 vector of coefficients. Notice that, at this stage,  j α  is 
constant across countries. This notional complication will turn useful later on. Hence, the 
combined random-intercept model is given by: 
j ij ij j ij u y 0 0        αx βz  
The probability of observing a positive response on the outcome variable is specified as: 
               ij j ij y αx βz 0 1 Pr  
where      is  the  standard  normal  cumulative  distribution  function.  The  likelihood 
contribution of an individual i in region j, conditional on  j u0 , is: 
       
ij ij y y
j ij u L
  
1
0 1 |       
Integrating the random term  j u0  out, the previous likelihood reads as: 
          

 
   j j
y y
ij du u L
ij ij
0 0
1 1        
Hence, let    be the variance matrix of the regional random effects, the overall likelihood 
function is: 
          

 
  
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j j
y y du u L
ij ij
0 0
1 1 ,         
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A3.1.1   The random coefficient model 
The  random  intercept  model  above  is  a  simplified  version  of  more  complex  multilevel 
models,  where  the  relationships  between  the  first  level  explanatory  variables  and  the 
outcome  of  interest  may  differ  across  level-2  units.  This  possibility  is  modelled  by 
introducing random slopes for level-1 explanatory variables. 
 The  random-coefficient  model  is  composed  by  the  two  levels  described  in  the  previous 
section  (A3.1)  and  (A3.2),  where  the  vector  of  regression  coefficients  on  the  level-1 
explanatory variables is allowed to depend on a set of country-specific characteristics  j z  and 
on a further stochastic component: 
j j j u γz α    0                    (A3.3) 
Combining (A3.1)-(A3.2)- (A3.3), the random-coefficient model is given by: 
  j ij ij j j j ij u y 0 0 0           x u γz βz  
The model is then composed of r+1 vector of random coefficients,  j u0  and  j u . The vector (
j u0 , j u1 ,..., rj u )  has  a  multivariate  normal  distribution  with  zero  mean  and  constant 
covariance matrix, which is independent on  ij  . 
The probability of observing a positive response on the outcome variable is specified as: 
                   ij j j ij y x γz βz 0 0 1 Pr  
The likelihood contribution of an individual i in region j, conditional on  j u0  and  j u , is: 
       
ij ij y y
j j ij u L
  
1
0 1 , |      u  
Integrating the random terms  j u0  and  j u  out, the previous likelihood reads as: 
            

 
   j j j j
y y
ij d du u L
ij ij u u 0 0
1 1         
Hence, let Ω be the variance matrix of the regional random effects, the overall likelihood 
function is: 
             

 
  
j i
j j j j
y y d du u L
ij ij u u 0 0
1 1 ,          
The likelihood function is approximated via a Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
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